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Unfortunately, the most newsworthy aspect of detention centers in Latin 
America is their propensity to explode into horrendous violence: fires, uprisings 
(or riots) that claim the lives of dozens of detainees, and clashes between rival 
gangs or organized criminal groups, and mass escapes.  Several thousand have 
perished in prison violence in Latin America in the past few decades—a single 
incident at the Comayagua Prison claimed the lives of 362 inmates in Honduras 
in February 2012.1  The underlying conditions that give rise to these collective 
acts of violence are well known and studied.  Scholars have assessed the 
relationship between severe overcrowding, limited resources and poor services, 
and self-rule by detainees.2  Such self-rule is aggravated by high levels of 
violence and illicit markets within prisons.3  The combination is highly volatile 
and poses grave dangers to the lives and wellbeing of detainees, authorities, and 
often the larger society beyond prisons.  Prison administration, and the 
corresponding literature on detention centers, mainly addresses the battle for 
control within detention centers.  Study of informal organizations in prisons in 
Latin America focuses on the exercise of control over daily life inside detention 
centers, including the extreme example of “self-rule by inmates.”4  
Unfortunately, the primary alternative to self-rule by detainees has been an 
authoritarian model in which prison officials control all aspects of inmates’ lives, 
 
 1. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON H. R., REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE SITUATION OF PERSONS DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY IN HONDURAS 1 (2013), 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/pdl/docs/pdf/HONDURAS-PPL-2013ENG.pdf. 
 2. LUCÍA DAMMERT & LIZA ZÚÑIGA, LA CÁRCEL: PROBLEMAS Y DESAFÍOS PARA LAS 
AMÉRICAS, 3 (2008); Elías Carranza, La Política Criminal en América Latina, in MINISTERIO DE 
JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, POLÍTICA CRIMINAL Y REFORMA PENITENCIARIA: EN EL 
MARCO DE UN GOBIERNO DEMOCRÁTICO E INCLUSIVO 200–201, 205 (2012). 
 3. JONATHAN D. ROSEN & MARTEN W. BRIENEN, PRISONS IN THE AMERICAS IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A HUMAN DUMPING GROUND, IX-XI (2016); Sacha Darke & Chris 
Garces, Surviving in the New Mass Carceral Zone, PRISON SERV. J., 2, 4, 6 (2017). 
 4. See generally JOSÉ RICARDO RAMALHO, MUNDO DO CRIME: A ORDEM PELO AVESSO 
(2008); JOSÉ LUIS PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES: UNA ETNOGRAFÍA DEL PENAL DE 
LURIGANCHO (1994) (Peru) [hereinafter PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES]; JOSÉ LUIS 
PÉREZ GUADALUPE, ‘DE FLAITES A COCODRILOS:’ EL CAMBIO GENERACIONAL DE LA 
DELINCUENCIA CHILENA (1995) (tesis de licenciatura en sociología, ILADES, Pontificia 
Universidad Gregoriana de Roma) [hereinafter PÉREZ GUADALUPE, ‘DE FLAITES A COCODRILOS’]; 
JOSÉ LUIS PÉREZ GUADALUPE, NUEVAS DROGAS, NUEVOS DELICUENTES (1998) (tesis de master 
en criminología, San Sebastián: Instituto Vasco de Criminología) [hereinafter PÉREZ GUADALUPE, 
NUEVAS DROGAS]; JOSÉ LUIS PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL DE LA REALIDAD 
CARCELARIA (2000) [hereinafter PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL]; JUAN CARLOS 
PINTO QUINTANILLA, CÁRCEL DE SAN PEDRO: RADIOGRAFÍA DE LA INJUSTICIA (1995); David 
Skarbek, Covenants Without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally, 110 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 845, 852 (2016); Andrés Antillano, When Prisoners Make the Prison.  Self-Rule in 
Venezuelan Prisons, PRISON SERV. J., 26, 26 (2017). 
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often through isolation, draconian policies, and violence.5  Until recently, prison 
administration in Peru, the country that provides the main case study for this 
article, has alternated between these extreme and dysfunctional models.6  This 
article considers a novel approach to managing volatile detention centers applied 
in Peru for a decade (2011–2020) with promising results and we contend, the 
potential to transform prisons in Latin America. 
In the 1980s, the National Penitentiary Institute of Peru–Instituto Nacional 
Penitenciario del Perú, INPE–largely abandoned its function as administrator 
of detention centers, leaving the National Police in charge.7  The National Police, 
of course, was an institution without specialized training in prison management.  
The result was informal organization by prisoners and the development of a 
system of entirely autonomous self-rule by inmates.8  The most emblematic case 
was the Lurigancho Penitentiary (the largest prison in the country), in which the 
detainees established their own fully functional internal organization, while the 
police limited themselves to external control of the prison.9  The prisoners at 
Lurigancho quite literally held the keys to the jail.10  They controlled entrance 
and exit from cells and cellblocks, decided which people and products could 
circulate, and imposed their own internal norms.  In addition, to protect 
cellblocks from attacks by other detainees, prisoners maintained stocks of 
knives, firearms of various types, spears and even hand grenades.11 
Beginning in 2002, INPE began to retake control of prisons, but self-rule 
continued.  In 2008, a report by National Geographic identified Lurigancho as 
 
 5. De Dardel, Julie & Söderström, Ola, The Rise and Fall of Supermax: How the US Prison 
Model and Ultra-punitive Penal Policy Travelled to Colombia 15 (Maison d’analyze des Processus 
Sociaux, Université de Neuchatel, Working paper 3-2015/E, 2015). 
 6. Stephen Nathan, El sistema penitenciario: Modelo de gestión privada o pública, in 
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS: POLÍTICA CRIMINAL Y REFORMA 
PENITENCIARIA EN EL MARCO DE UN GOBERNO DEMOCRÁTICO E INCLUSIVO 295, 309 (2012).  
Many of the observations about detention centers in Latin America are based on the personal 
observations of the three authors.  Pérez Guadalupe has worked in the prison system for civil society 
organizations and later for the state for three decades; he has also visited and studied conditions in 
detention centers across Latin America.  See, e.g., JOSÉ LUIS PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA 
CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL DE LA REALIDAD CARCELARIA (Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia 
Universidad Católica del Perú, 2000) (assessing, based on months of research in detention centers 
themselves, the social organization of prisons in Perú, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia); 
Cavallaro has documented conditions in prisons for Human Rights Watch, Justiça Global (Brazil) 
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for a quarter century; he has visited scores 
of detention centers across the Americas and has published books and articles on prison conditions 
and the social structures in prisons.  Lucía Nuñovero Cisneros worked between 2005 and 2011 in 
human rights projects in the Santa Mónica, and Callao Penitentiaries.  From 2012 to 2013, she 
advised the Ministry of Justice of Peru on Penitentiary Policy. 
 7. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 1. 
 8. PEREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 170–223. 
 9. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 3. 
 10. Id. at 3. 
 11. Id. at 109–10. 
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one of the most dangerous prisons in the world, emphasizing how detainees 
exercised control and established internal rules.12  This same situation of self-
rule, or self-rule by inmates, was primarily the norm in most of Peru’s 
penitentiaries.13 
In this context, the Peruvian Prison Reform Process began in 2011.  At the 
time, Peru faced the same problems that characterize detention centers in Latin 
America: shortage of staff and budget, inadequate infrastructure, and high levels 
of overcrowding (resulting from increases in violent crime).  INPE managed to 
achieve institutional reorganization and restored internal order in prisons, 
eliminating riots, shootings, hostage taking incidents and hunger strikes.  The 
reform process also reduced the number of violent deaths and escapes.  More 
than anything, though, the reform process served to break the grip that Peruvian 
criminal groups exercised inside prisons.  As data collected for this article 
shows, while prison overcrowding has increased and street crime has become 
more violent and lethal, prisons in Peru remain considerably less violent than in 
the past. 
This article seeks to present and explain this reform process and to draw 
lessons from its success.  To do so, we begin by contextualizing the challenges 
of detention centers in Latin America.  We summarize the major elements of the 
Prison Reform Process launched in Peru in 2011, which included the design and 
construction of maximum-security centers, efforts to attack corruption, and a 
restructuring of the prison guard service.  That said, the most important aspect 
of the Reform Process was the “incorporation” of the informal organization by 
inmates themselves as a key element of a sustained policy of Management by 
Dialogue (gestión dialogada).  We believe that this practice was central in the 
process of reestablishing authority and institutional administration (Gobierno 
Institucional) in detention centers across the country.  The Prison Reform 
Process managed to eliminate i) self-rule by inmates, and ii) institutional 
authoritarianism, extreme but common elements of detention centers throughout 
the Americas.14  Finally, based on this concrete experience and the three authors’ 
collective understanding of detention centers in Latin America, this article ends 
by proposing a new model of prison administration we call “Prison 
Governance.” 
I.  THE CHALLENGES OF PRISON MANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
In Latin America, the principal indicators of the prison problem are the 
increase in prison population per capita, and the concomitant rates of 
overcrowding, shown in Table 1.  This problem is also related to the limited 
 
 12. World’s Toughest Prisons (National Geographic television broadcast Dec. 21, 2019). 
 13. PEREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 415–17. 
 14. Mirte Postema, James Cavallaro & Ruhan Nagra, Advancing Security and Human Rights 
by the Controlled Organisation of Inmates, PRISON SERV. J., 57, 59–62 (2017) (describing case 
studies in Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru). 
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resources afforded penitentiary institutions and the levels of violence reported 
in many Latin American detention centers.15 
 




The most severe situation in terms of soaring prison population can be seen in 
Central America.  In El Salvador, for instance, between 2000 and 2016, the rate 
of incarceration increased four-fold, from 130 to 559 detainees per 100,000 
inhabitants.17  In Panama, the incarceration rate rose from 280 to 426 per 
100,000 inhabitants during this same period.18  South American states follow a 
similar pattern as in Central America.  The case of Brazil is worth highlighting: 
its incarceration rate has nearly tripled, from 133 to 307 per 100,000 inhabitants 
over the past fifteen years.19  Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay have all 
reached incarceration rates of at least 240 per 100,000.20 
Thus, the first prison administration challenge faced by Latin American states 
is the increasing rate of incarceration and overcrowding, with all that such 
overcrowding implies in terms of provision of services, maintenance of 
 
 15. DAMMERT & ZÚÑIGA, supra note 2, at 3; Carranza, supra note 2, at 193; ROSEN & 
BRIENEN, supra note 3, ix-xi; Darke & Garces, supra note 3, at 2–3, 7. 
 16. World Prison Brief, UNIV. OF BIRKBECH- LONDON, https://www.prisonstudies.org/
world-prison-brief-data (Data compiled 2014–2016, including federal and provincial systems and 
in some cases, detainees held in police lockups). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. 
COUNTRY 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014-2016 VAR
El Salvador 7,754 10,907 12,073 14,771 19,814 24,662 27,033 36,235 367%
Paraguay 3,219 4,621 6,101 6,037 5,867 6,197 7,916 12,741 269%
Venezuela 14,196 19,368 19,951 19,257 24,069 40,825 45,224 49,664 250%
Ecuador 8,029 8,723 11,358 12,635 12,067 11,800 21,080 25,902 223%
Guatemala 6,974 8,077 8,698 7,477 8,158 11,148 15,013 20,697 197%
Peru 27,734 27,417 31,311 35,835 43,286 45,464 58,019 79,664 187%
Brazil 232,755 239,345 336,358 401,236 451,429 496,251 548,003 622,202 167%
Colombia 51,518 52,936 68,020 60,021 69,979 84,444 113,884 120,668 134%
Costa Rica 7,575 8,113 8,890 9,037 9,682 12,110 14,555 17,440 130%
Uruguay 4,469 5,630 6,888 6,887 7,665 8,700 9,418 9,996 124%
Panama 8,652 10,423 11,400 11,575 9,651 12,293 14,468 17,197 99%
Bolivia 8,151 6,065 6,495 7,031 7,433 9,406 14,272 14,598 79%
Nicaragua 6,539 6,885 6,233 6,103 6,803 6,500 9,800 10,569 62%
Mexico 154,765 172,888 193,889 210,140 219,754 219,027 239,089 233,469 51%
Honduras 11,500 11,502 10,931 11,178 11,390 11,846 12,095 17,017 48%
Chile 33,050 34,901 36,374 39,417 48,826 54,628 51,882 42,971 30%
Argentina* 57,632 57,632 65,351 60,621 60,611 65,095 66,484 69,060 20%
TOTAL 644,512 685,433 840,321 919,258 1,016,484 1,120,396 1,268,235 1,400,070 117%
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infrastructure, treatment of inmates and management of internal and external 
security.  As we see in Table 1, the highest levels of overcrowding can be found 
in El Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela, Bolivia and Perú.21  Studies, such as 
those by Metaal and Youngers, demonstrate that this surge has resulted from an 
increase in the number of those detained while facing, or after conviction for 
criminal charges, often drug related offenses.  Sentences for these offenses are 
substantial in the Americas.22  The problem is compounded by extensive periods 
spent by thousands of detainees in pre-trial detention throughout Latin 
America.23  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has documented 
the high percentage of detainees awaiting trial in the Americas.  While the figure 
across the region is over thirty-six percent, in some countries the percentage of 
those held prior to conviction or acquittal has surpassed seventy-five percent.24  
The combination of long sentences and pre-trial detention has led to vast 
overcrowding, which in turn has generated high levels of violence and conflict 
inside detention centers.25  This is particularly the case in those prisons in which 
groups of detainees have developed self-governance structures that allow them 




 21. See id. 
 22. Metaal, Pien & Youngers Coletta, Sistemas Sobrecargados. Leyes de Drogas y Cárceles 
en América Latina, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTO & WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA at 
5 (2010); Irrational Punishment: Drug Laws and incarceration in Latin America, in THE 
RESEARCH CONSORTIUM ON DRUGS AND THE LAW 3 (Sergio Chaparro, Catalina Pérez, & Coletta 
Youngers eds. 2017); Marcelo Bergman & Elena Azaola, Cárceles de México: Cuadros de una 
Crisis, 1 REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE SEGURIDAD CIUDADANA 74, 74 (2007); Lucía 
Nunovero Cisneros, Factores de Aumento de la Población Penitenciaria en el Perú, Medidas 
Alternativas y Vigilancia Electrónica, 37 ESTUDIOS PENALES Y CRIMINOLÓGICOS 349, 380 (2017). 
 23. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON H. R., REPORT ON MEASURES AIMED AT REDUCING THE USE OF 
PRETRIAL DETENTION IN THE AMERICAS 22, 22, n.12 (2017), http://www.oas.org/en/
iachr/reports/pdfs/PretrialDetention.pdf. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 21, n.2. 
 26. ROSEN & BRIENEN, supra note 3, at ix; Darke & Garces, supra note 3, at 5–7. 
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Graph 1: Prison Overcrowding in Latin American Countries, 201727 
 
 
Despite its prevalence, violence in Latin American detention centers, or more 
precisely the dynamics of this violence, has not been the subject of sufficient 
academic study.  Literature from other regions indicates that the levels of 
violence among inmates and collective violence may be measured by looking to 
the number of violent incidents in detention centers.28  Figures on violent deaths, 
riots, and disturbances suggest failures in governance and show a relationship to 
the excessive use of force and recidivism.29 
In this regard, the prisons issue in the majority of Latin American states, 
including Peru, has generally been understood from a perspective that 
foregrounds resource scarcity and the perceived need to invest in prison 
infrastructure.30  The structural deficit, though, has been accompanied by 
problems of prison administration, widespread corruption, the proliferation of 
drug and weapons markets within detention centers, deficient provision of food 
and health services, as well as high levels of pretrial detention.31  These are 
 
 27. World Prison Brief, UNIV. OF BIRKBECH- LONDON, https://www.prisonstudies.org/
world-prison-brief-data (Data compiled 2014–2016, including federal and provincial systems and 
in some cases, detainees held in police lockups). 
 28. Benjamin Steiner & John Wooldredge, Rethinking the Link Between Institutional 
Crowding and Inmate Misconduct, 89 PRISON J. 205, 218 (2009). 
 29. See Daniel P. Mears & Jamie Watson, Towards a Fair and Balanced Assessment of 
Supermax Prisons, 23 JUST. Q. 232, 242 (2006). 
 30. Stephen Nathan, El Sistema Penitenciario: Modelo de Gestión Privada o Pública, in 
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS: POLÍTICA CRIMINAL Y REFORMA 
PENITENCIARIA EN EL MARCO DE UN GOBERNO DEMOCRÁTICO E INCLUSIVO 295, 296–97 (2012); 
Lucia Nuñovero Cisneros, Quel Avenir Pour les Mesures Alternatives à L’Incarcération dans la 
Démarche Politico-Criminelle Péruvienne?, 35 ARCHIVES DE POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE 243, 245, 
247–48 (2013). 
 31. Darke & Garcés, supra note 3, at 2, 4, 6; IBÁN DE REMENTERÍA, LAS DROGAS DE LOS 
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fundamental aspects of prison administration that have been given insufficient 
attention in the existing literature.  Still, studies have not only described the 
informal organization of detainees––and their ability to oppose institutional 
control––but have also demonstrated the relationship between unfair and 
coercive prison administration and inmate violence.32  In sum, the problems of 
Latin American prisons go far beyond lack of infrastructure. 
II.  FROM SELF-ORGANIZATION TO SELF-RULE BY INMATES 
To begin, we should differentiate between informal organization and self-
organization of inmates, present in the vast majority of “total institutions” such 
as prisons,33 and “self-rule”––or “self-government”––by inmates, which occurs 
when a given detention center permits or is unable to stop detainees from seizing 
control of the prison.  What, we may ask, leads informal organization of inmates 
to devolve into self-rule by inmates?  To respond to this question, we must first 
identify the principal actors in prison life—staff and detainees—and analyze the 
role of each in this process. 
In prisons with large numbers of inmates with ties to criminal subcultures––
major gangs such as the Central American maras, criminal syndicates such as 
drug trafficking cartels, etc.––one would expect that these groups would seek to 
impose their own rules and norms of co-existence inside the detention center.  
Common sense tells us that when prisons are overcrowded, with insufficient 
prison staff, poor infrastructure and limited resources, the consolidation of “self-
rule” by inmates is more likely.34 
One thus finds two forces––formal authorities and organized groups of 
inmates––in direct conflict within the detention center, each seeking the same 
objective: control of the prison.  Strong, efficient penitentiary institutions are 
more able to contain the efforts of “delinquent inmates” to control the prison.35  
These inmates and their prison culture can be neutralized with intelligent and 
adequately resourced prison administration.  That is, the development of “self-
rule by inmates” does not depend solely on detainees themselves, but also on the 
capacity and will of prison authorities.  If control of detention centers is not a 
public security priority––as, unfortunately, is often the case––and if staff are not 
subject to a functioning system of incentives and disincentives, then they may 
 
Americas, in PRISONS IN THE AMERICAS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6-10 (Jonathan D. Rosen 
and Marten W. Brienen eds., 2015). 
 32. See BERT USEEM & PETER KIMBALL, STATES OF SIEGE: U.S. PRISON RIOTS, 1971–1986 
92–97 (1991); MARK COLVIN, THE PENITENTIARY IN CRISIS: FROM ACCOMMODATION TO RIOT 
IN NEW MEXICO 193205 (1992); Benjamin Steiner, H. Daniel Butler & Jared M. Ellison, Causes 
and Correlates of Prison Inmate Misconduct: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 42 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 462, 464 (2014). 
 33. ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL 
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 3–5 (1961). 
 34. Astrid Arrarás and Emily D. Bello-Pardo, supra note 31, at 9. 
 35. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, 168–69. 
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abandon their work within the prison.36  That is, absent the appropriate 
incentives, staff will be less likely to risk their lives to enforce administration 
policies.  Further, they may receive benefits in exchange for their complicity or 
assistance with the order established by prison leaders. 
Later in this article, when we turn to “Prison Governance” we will consider 
concrete cases in which one finds all the elements that ordinarily lead to self-
rule by inmates but in which the prison authorities have been able to maintain 
control.  In these concrete cases, as we explain, seizure of control and 
implementation of self-rule by inmates have been avoided through dialogue and 
co-responsibility of the actors involved, as well as the incorporation of the self-
organization mechanisms of inmates.37 
A.  Inmate Organizations: What We Know From the Literature 
In this regard, numerous American criminology studies of the informal 
organization of detainees and “prison subcultures,” dating back to the 1930s, 
provide context to understand how these subcultures affect different models of 
prison administration proposed by experts.  One of the first studies, by Donald 
Clemmer, published in 1941, described the existence of a strong, informal 
organization of inmates in American prisons.38  Clemmer observed among 
prisoners their own system of values and norms, as well as their ability to resist 
institutional objectives.39  Subsequent studies have highlighted the codes and 
language of inmates.40 
Clemmer termed the process by which detainees adopt the customs, rules and 
tactics of prison life on entering detention centers as “prisonization.”41  Prison 
culture arises from the values and behavior in the detention context, focusing in 
particular on the conditions of deprivation of liberty, the structures and logic of 
prison, the relationships that these foster and detainees’ lack of autonomy.42  In 
the Latin American context, Pérez Guadalupe has demonstrated that 
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prisonization is not the only process that occurs within jails and penitentiaries.43  
Pérez Guadalupe has explained that those deprived of liberty come to prison 
with cultural practices and identities developed before incarceration.44  He terms 
the process by which the cultures from outside the prison interact with the 
detention center as presonización, from the Spanish term preso or prisoner.45  
That is, without minimizing the influence of the prison on inmates, Pérez 
Guadalupe underscores the influence of inmates themselves on daily life in 
detention, a phenomenon that recurs in the majority of overcrowded detention 
centers in the region.46  These two complementary visions can be synthesized in 
two theories of prison cultures: the autonomous theory, which asserts the 
existence of a particular prison culture created by conditions in a given detention 
center, and the cultural importation theory, which asserts that the degree of 
adaptation of inmates in prisons depends on the external conditions prior to 
incarceration.47  Pérez Guadalupe has described a continuum of local criminality 
subculture that is transferred to the prison.  This, in turn, foments the 
development of prison cultures and the subsequent influence, though the return 
of prisoners to society, of these cultures on the practices of criminality in each 
country.48 
Following Clemmer, various American authors have addressed a range of 
issues related to these dynamics.  Scholars have considered the relationship 
between informal and formal organizations of detainees and the goals of prison 
administration, as well as the role of informal leaders and their contribution to 
the goal of rehabilitation.49  These authors have demonstrated that authorizing 
visits, use of telephones and other items permits inmates to make daily life more 
tolerable while allowing them to maintain their lifestyles and social relations, 
including their criminal identity.50  Other studies, such as that by Camp and 
Camp, emphasized the need to control the importation into the detention context 
of criminal subcultures.51  Irwin and Cressey posited that disorder and inefficient 
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administration of detention centers were the principal causes of violence 
between and among inmates.52 
John Dilulio, one of the most influential scholars in the field of prison 
administration, was a harsh critic of administration practices that included 
organizations of inmates.53  Dilullio is very concerned by the risk posed by 
participation of inmates in prison administration through figures such as inmate 
advisory councils, bodies authorized to negotiate with the administration on 
behalf of detainees.54  The participation of inmates’ organizations, Dilulio wrote, 
through the election of gang leaders to positions of authority, could transform 
these bodies into a form of self-rule by inmates.55 
Dilulio warned that the management of the prison would be placed at risk 
should authorities be unable to impose their will without the participation of 
inmates.56  Thus, he supported a careful selection and oversight of inmate leaders 
to avoid negative results.57  Dilulio contrasted two extreme forms of prison 
administration: i) the control model, characterized by a robust role for prison 
administrators, which establishes and applies regulations and sanctions over 
virtually all aspects of the life of detainees, and ii) the responsibility model, 
which permits the administration to maintain order through controls and 
restrictions on the prison population, at the same that it permits some degree of 
self-rule.58 
In the control model, communication and directives from the administration 
to prison staff are restricted to clearly established, professional and formal 
channels, and lines of command in accordance with rank and authority level.59  
Quasi-military uniforms and insignia are employed; compliance with policies 
and procedures to ensure control involve strict routines, close monitoring, and 
oversight of the activities of inmates.60  Any non-conforming behavior by 
detainees results in report, disciplinary procedures and sanctions imposed in 
visible and exemplary fashion.61  All decisions are taken exclusively by prison 
administrators.62 
By contrast, if the chain of command, protocols, directives, and 
communication between administrators and prison staff are rigid, hierarchical, 
and strict in the control model, then in the responsibility model communication 
 
 52. Irwin & Cressey, supra note 47, at 334. 
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 60. Id. at 100–05, 175. 
 61. Id. at 102–03. 
 62. Id. at 175. 
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between administrators and staff is informal, open, and direct.  Relations 
between detainees and prison staff are informal and casual.  Inmates may initiate 
contact with staff, request explanations, and express opinions about perceived 
unfairness or injustices, etc.63  Thus, inmates enjoy greater freedom to comply 
with the policies and procedures of the detention center.64  Infractions and 
disruptive behavior are subject to sanctions at the discretion of the prison staff.65  
Means of deciding on sanctions include counsels or other groups, as well as 
negotiation with detainees, who may be involved in making decisions.66 
The consensus model is a third alternative that lies between these two 
extremes.  This model is characterized by the application of rules and policies 
through a combination of control, order, and formal and informal 
communication between the administration and prison staff.67  The consensus 
model also includes an emphasis on compliance with formal procedures that 
involve detainees themselves.68 
Darke’s studies in six Brazilian prisons demonstrate how, at least in the Latin 
American centers he considered, life in prison is directed and controlled by 
inmates and not by penitentiary staff.69  In these prisons, it is those deprived of 
liberty in inhumane conditions who organize to provide cleaning, other services, 
distribution of goods, and to ensure discipline and security.70  The process of 
filling this management vacuum results in the administration of prisons by gangs 
like the First Command of the Capital––Primeiro Comando da Capital, PCC––
and the Red Command ––Comando Vermelho, CV.71  It is worth noting here that 
the origin of the First Command of the Capital, Brazil’s most powerful and 
dangerous criminal organization, can be traced to the initially legitimate protests 
against physical abuses by guards raised by a group of detainees in a particularly 
brutal prison in São Paulo.72  The fact that a group initially focused on rights 
abuses suffered in detention could morph into a massive, dangerous, criminal 
enterprise speaks volumes on the importance of treating those detained, and all 
others, with a minimum degree of humanity.73 
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Darke, in a later work, speaks of discipline and order as a negotiated co-
production of prison administrators, the general prison population and gangs.  
Weegels, in a similar vein, describes the “arrangements” (arreglos) between the 
detainees and authorities in Nicaragua as a form of power sharing or co-
government in which inmates exert pressure through violent acts and riots.74  
Jennifer Peirce has also found these “arrangements” to exist in the old prisons 
of the Dominican Republic.75  These arrangements are characterized by the 
informal authority of the bosses who negotiate with prison authorities, 
generating mechanisms of pressure on the general prison population.76 
Andrés Antillano has studied the self-rule of detainees in Venezuelan 
detention centers based on informal structures that confront prison 
administration, maintaining order, and regulation of prison life through the use 
of violence, displacing control from authorities.77  One of the first ethnographies 
of the informal organization of detainees in Latin America was that of Pérez 
Guadalupe in the Lurigancho Penitentiary.78  Author Pérez Guadalupe studied 
Lurigancho for five years (1987–1992), documenting the lack of policies within 
the prison that allowed the 5,000 inmates to impose their own laws and norms.  
His subsequent works compare Lurigancho to informal organization in 
penitentiaries in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile.79 
The study of the informal organizations of detainees has enjoyed a resurgence 
in recent years in part due to the strength of these groups and the consequences 
of uncontrolled self-rule by detainees in some centers in Latin America.80  As 
Skarbek explains, this resurgence is a result of the rise of prison gangs, groups 
able to provide “centralized governance,” including dispute resolution 
mechanisms, a means of protecting private property, and security of illicit 
markets within the prison.81  Thus, the self-rule of inmates arises in the context 
 
formed the PCC to fight for justice for the massacre and to push for better prison 
conditions. 
First Capital Command - PCC, INSIGHT CRIME, https://www.insightcrime.org/brazil-organized-
crime-news/first-capital-command-pcc-profile (last updated Mar. 9, 2020). 
 74. Julienne Weegels, Prison Riots in Nicaragua: Negotiating Co-Governance Amid Creative 
Violence and Public Secrecy, 30 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 61, 62 (2020). 
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of detention, in which it is necessary to punish aggressive behavior, oversee 
internal conflicts, and control opportunism in the exchange of goods when these 
activities and behaviors are not controlled by the institution itself.  At the same 
time, self-rule serves to promote cooperation between and among inmates from 
diverse social, cultural and criminal cultures.82 
In the Americas, the study of self-rule has been driven in part by some of the 
more fantastic consequences of the power of these organizations.  The most 
extreme example has been uprisings in Brazilian detention centers over the past 
two decades.83  Various studies and human rights reports (referenced in this 
article) have observed the frequency and violent nature of these riots.84  At a 
superficial level, riots are attributed to the strength of prison gangs, as well as 
the dangerous and violent nature of the prison subculture, which is linked to the 
criminal subcultures outside prison.85  It is often true, in practice, that 
organizations inside prisons bear close ties to organizations outside detention 
centers. 
Perhaps the clearest example of the dangerous relationship between 
organizations within and without prison walls has been that of the “First 
Command of the Capital” (Primeiro Comando da Capital) in São Paulo, Brazil.  
In May 2006, in response to a proposed prisoner transfer to which they objected, 
the leaders of the PCC launched riots in dozens of detention centers throughout 
the state, as well as attacks outside prisons on police precincts across São 
Paulo.86  The violence shut down South America’s largest city for days.87  As 
two analysts have written in analyzing the intense, coordinated attacks, the PCC 
maintained a: 
hierarchical structure of disciplined and obedient “employees” 
capable of executing orders without questioning them. . . . [T]hey had 
an able and agile communication system among leaders, followers and 
those who took orders, through protected channels barely permeated 
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by external interference by means of cell phones, telephone exchanges 
and “carrier pigeons”. . . . [T]he organization was prepared to control 
the simultaneous execution of countless rebellions; to attack distinct 
targets without a predetermined logic and with a high level of surprise; 
to appear at any location and disappear immediately; to issue orders 
and soon after, suspend actions and negotiate with high state 
authorities.  What was most surprising is that the base territory of the 
entire organization is within the prisons of São Paulo State, in 
particular maximum security facilities where the main leaders of PCC 
are found.88 
In effect, according to Skarbek and Freire, the organizations of detainees 
function much like a government, providing social order and satisfying the 
internal demands not fulfilled by the authorities.89  In particular, these 
organizations offer security (by protecting the physical integrity of people, their 
property, and their spaces) and, at the same time, they promote the tranquility 
necessary for the exchange––or trafficking––of authorized or prohibited goods 
and services, through the threat of violence, to maintain order.90  Thus, the 
capacity of these organizations to control daily life in prison, a capacity that is 
superior to that of authorities, renders them a threat to deficient prison systems 
in the Americas.91 
Skarbek and Freire analyze the development and growth of prions gangs not 
so much as a matter of the logic and culture of criminal gangs being transferred 
from the streets into the prison, but rather as a rational response to the lacunae 
existing in closed centers.92  In other words, by tracing the history of the 
development of organizations within prisons, Skarbek and Freire demonstrate 
the economic rationality of these organizations.93  Further, they show precisely 
how the organization of these groups responds to the needs of detainees while 
in detention.  Thus, Skarbek and Freire’s analysis questions the core idea implicit 
in much prison literature—that criminal subcultures as they exist on the street 
are transferred into the prison space.94  Rather, what Skarbek and Freire show is 
that individuals in detention come together as groups to respond to the 
organizational needs left unfulfilled by prison structure.95  The importance of 
this, as we will see in the success of the Peruvian Prison Reform process, is that 
prisoners,96 whether gang members on the streets, or unaffiliated offenders, are 
likely to act rationally and in response to the structures and incentives inside 
 
 88. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 89. Skarbek & Freire, supra note 81, at 399, 404. 
 90. Id. at 400, 404 
 91. Id. at 399–400, 404. 
 92. Id. at 400. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. at 399–400, 404. 
 96. See infra Sec. III. 
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detention centers once they find themselves in those confined spaces.  As such, 
by changing the incentives and disincentives for different kinds of organizations 
within prisons, authorities can change the very nature of prisoner organizations 
within prisons.  Thus, life within prison is not destined to be ruled by whatever 
principals or groups exist and “rule” on the street.  No doubt, the subcultures 
that detainees bring with them from their lives before detention are relevant.  But 
this is true of the relationship between the cultures within institutions and the 
cultures of those who come together to form those institutions.  Military culture 
is a function of the cultures of those in the military, just as college campus 
culture is related to the subcultures of those who come together in the university.  
No serious study of either of those institutions, however, would contend that life 
in the military or in colleges can be explained primarily by the cultures of high 
school students.  The same youths from high school become troops and 
university students, but in those settings develop very different institutional 
cultures. 
Instead, prison organization can be restructured as long as that organization 
takes into account prisoners’ experiences, their interests, and their rationality.  
Common sense dictates that provided their basic needs are addressed, and as 
long as detainees see concrete advantage to engaging peacefully with authorities, 
they are likely to do so.97  Prison life is not street life.  The idea that detainees 
are doomed to form violent, dangerous, powerful organizations in direct and 
permanent conflict with authorities simply because that is what criminals do is 
not based in social science.  The belief may be popular, but cannot withstand 
scrutiny, as we demonstrate with reference to the Peruvian experience.  
Intelligent structures and management of detention centers that engage with the 
organizations of detainees in ways that are respectful, but that also ensure respect 
for authorities and staff and common, decent standards of co-existence, can be 
achieved.  Indeed, this was achieved in Peru.98 
III.  CO-RESPONSIBLE PRISON GOVERNANCE IN THE PERUVIAN PRISON 
REFORM PROCESS, 2011–2019: FOUR MODELS 
The urgency for reform of the penitentiary system in Peru arose as a political 
priority after the end of the Fujimori administration in 2000.99  At that time, the 
Ministry of Justice developed prison infrastructure plans to be implemented in 
public-private partnerships.100  The year 2002 saw the approval of the National 
Penitentiary Treatment Plan (Plan Nacional de Tratamiento Penitenciario) 
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(“Plan”).101  The Plan viewed overcrowding as the most serious issue, and thus 
established as its first measure a penitentiary infrastructure construction plan.102  
Five years later, new “Penitentiary Policies” (Políticas Penitenciarias) were 
approved, which included concrete actions to respond to overcrowding through 
the use of public treasury resources, as well as strategic alliances with the private 
sector in an ambitious program to build detention centers.  However, these plans 
never came to fruition.103 
The prison reform process begun in 2011, on which this article is based (the 
Peruvian Prison Reform Process), was designed with an integral approach.  The 
Reform Process sought to include different aspects of prison administration, 
expressing these in a Ministerial Resolution entitled “10 Penitentiary System 
Reform Measures” (10 Medidas de Reforma del Sistema Penitenciario, 
Resolución Ministerial Nº 0141-2012-JUS).104  Two central points of departure 
were prison staff corruption and detention center overcrowding.105  In addition, 
the Resolution included measures designed to enhance infrastructure quality; to 
improve prison security, health care, service programs, and institutional 
administration; to improve the quality of personnel; to stimulate participation of 
the private sector; to prevent and reduce crime; and to establish a reeducation 
program.106  In late 2016, authorities issued three additional legislative decrees 
on penitentiary benefits, and on restructuring and strengthening of the prison 
system (DL Nº 1296, Nº1325 y Nº1328).107  As we contend here, despite the 
change of national administration that year, the Prison Reform Process 
continued.  The most visible result of these efforts (2013–2019) nationally was 
a significant reduction in internal violence.  As we show, after years of repeated, 
massive riots, there were none for several consecutive years and then a lone 
rioting incident at the end of 2018.  The incident took place in a cellblock in the 
“special closed regime,” or highest security prison in Challapalca, a center that 
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held fewer than 200 inmates.108  We highlight  the most important aspects of the 
Reform in the pages that follow. 
A.  The Battle Against Corruption 
The first urgent, cross-cutting measure was the fight against corruption.109  
The Reform Process began with a “risk map” of corruption that identified five 
critical moments: a) intake at the “little jail” (carceleta) and classification; b) 
entrance into the prison and placement in a cellblock and cell; c) remaining or 
relocation (in a given prison, cellblock or cell) while in detention, receipt of 
food, entry of items or visits, access to public phone, and processing of requests 
by inmates and their families; d) procedures for detainees’ records and emission 
of forms by prison staff; e) procedures involving detainees’ permanent files, 
completion of conviction and release of the detainee.110  On this last point, it 
should be noted that the Peruvian Penal Code, like the law in much of Latin 
America, contemplates progression of persons deprived of liberty from “closed 
regime,” or full-time incarceration, through day release, to parole, based on 
technical examinations applied by prison staff.111  Given the discretion involved 
in these decisions, progressing, or not progressing at any stage, involves the risk 
of corruption. 
The Reform Process identified the main corruption risks according to area 
(administration, treatment and security) and according to the level of corruption: 
a) macro-corruption, involving the highest level authorities, such as the illicit 
award of contracts for construction or prison maintenance or the hiring of 
unqualified consultants; b) medium level corruption, involving the directors and 
administrators of prisons, such as authorizing suppliers who failed to comply 
with legal requirements or the purchase at inflated prices of goods or furniture; 
and c) micro-corruption, involving prison staff seeking bribes from inmates or 
visitors, such as charging to transfer from one cellblock to another, or for 
favorable technical (day leave or parole) reports, or to allow irregular visits by 
relatives.112  This classification allowed for greater oversight and control of staff, 
and a significant increase in sanctions (the overwhelming majority for acts of 
corruption), as can be seen in Table 2, below. 
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Table 2: Decisions of the Disciplinary Tribunal, INPE 2006–2018113 
 
Until 2014, disciplinary procedures were carried out under a disciplinary 
regime that was modified in 2015.114  In 2015, disciplinary sanctions fell 
drastically.  As shown in the table, in subsequent years, the number of sanctions 
issued increased again, although the number of terminations fell considerably. 
In addition, Presidential Decree Nº232-2012-INPE/P created the Special 
Anticorruption Group (Grupo Especial Anticorrupción, GEA).115  A toll-free, 
anti-corruption telephone hotline was established to receive anonymous 
complaints regarding acts of corruption committed by prison staff.116  This type 
of intervention, in turn, contributed to the increase in the number of reports 
recommending disciplinary processes against INPE staff, as is seen in Graph 2. 
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disciplinario-y-procedimiento-resolucion-n-101-2015-servir-pe-1215676-1/. 
 115. Resolución Presidencial Instituto Nacional Penitenciario N°232-2012-INPE/P (May 17, 
2012) (Peru). 





2006 to 2010 7 10 15 6 38
2011 36 140 85 33 294
2012 31 75 11 8 125
2013 25 113 55 8 201
2014 26 73 52 3 154
2015 1 2 12 1 16
2016 1 20 30 10 61
2017 3 22 19 9 53
2018 0 31 79 24 125
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Graph 2.  Reports Recommending Opening of Disciplinary Processes, INPE 2011–2018 
Based on data provided by INPE (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario, 2019) * 
See Note, Table 2. 
B.  Investment in Infrastructure 
As may be seen in Graph 3, between 2011 and 2016, capacity increased by 
6,600 nationally.  An additional 3,500 spaces in detention centers were under 
construction.117  This increase in capacity was a central element of the Prison 
Reform Plan’s goal of increasing space in existing detention centers and adding 
new prisons.118  Despite the fact that this increase was far greater than any 
growth in capacity in the two previous decades, it was insufficient to respond to 
the rapid growth in the prison population (30,000 additional inmates between 
2011 and 2016).119  During this period, the following new prisons were built or 
entirely remodeled: Virgen de Fátima, Satipo, Yurimaguas, Tarapoto, Juanjuí, 
Chincha, Puno, Trujillo (women), and Cerro de Pasco.  Capacity was added in 
the following detention centers: Cajamarca, Puerto Maldonado, Jauja, Ancón I, 
Trujillo (men), and Chimbote.120  Within this infrastructure plan, emphasis 
should be placed on the construction of the new Cerro de Pasco jail (at an altitude 
of more than 4,000 meters, or some 13,000 feet above sea level), including 600 
 
 117. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 10 MEDIDAS DE REFORMA DEL 
SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO 1, 4 (2012), http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/
810635CDF2139A7F052581300073F277/$FILE,10_medidas.pdf. 
 118. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 10 MEDIDAS DE REFORMA DEL 
SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO 1, 2 (2012), http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/
810635CDF2139A7F052581300073F277/$FILE,10_medidas.pdf. 
 119. Nunovero Cisneros, Factores de Aumento, supra note 107, at 358. 
 120. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 10 MEDIDAS DE REFORMA DEL 
SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO 1, 5 (2012), http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/
810635CDF2139A7F052581300073F277/$FILE,10_medidas.pdf. 
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places in “special closed regime” (the most restrictive, high security regime in 
the Peruvian prison system).121 
Graph 3.  Overcrowding and Housing Capacity in Peruvian Detention Centers, 2006-2018.122 
 
Despite the significant growth in prison population in recent years, there has 
not been a parallel increase in the amounts budgeted for the National Prison 
Service, INPE, as can be seen in Graph 4.123  The amount of capital investments 
averaged 130 million Peruvian Soles, or around US$30 million, employed in the 
construction of new prisons and the overhaul of others.  What did increase were 
current expenses (which doubled from 302 million soles in 2011 to 654 million 
soles in 2018).124  That is, INPE was faced with a significant increase in inmates 





 121. Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, supra note 112, at 96. 
 122. Statistics, supra note 113. 
 123. TRANSPARENCIA ECONÓMICA PERU, CONSULTA AMIGABLE (MENSUALS): CONSULTÁ 
DE EJECUCIÓN DEL GASTO, https://apps5.mineco.gob.pe/transparencia/mensual/. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Lucía Nunovero Cisneros, Cárceles en América Latina 2000-2018: Tendencias y desafíos 
(Pontifical Catholic U. of Peru, Working paper No. 50, 2019). 
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Graph 4. Current Expenses, Capital Expenses and Prison Population, 2006–2018.126 
 
 
C.  Prison Staff 
In 2011, the Peruvian Legislature approved the Law on the Special Public 
Penitentiary Career, (Ley de la Carrera Especial Pública Penitenciaria, Ley N° 
29709).127  The application of this law led to better working conditions and wage 
increases for prison security and non-security staff, as well as to the 
incorporation of new hires.128  In addition, the law allowed for the creation of 
differentiation of levels of employment, thus rendering work in the penitentiary 
system a career.129  The law also developed disciplinary procedures and 
strengthened the system for punishing irregularities and infractions committed 
by prison staff.  INPE hired “public administrators” (gerentes públicos),130 in 
 
 126. Statistics, supra note 113.  For the purposes of this graph “POP” means “Prison 
Population” and “SOLES” are Peruvian currency. 
 127. Ley de la Carrera Especial Pública Penitenciaria, Ley N° 29709, EL PERUANO 444765 
(2011), https://leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/Leyes/29709.pdf. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 444768. 
 130. The term “public administrators” refers to high level staff, duly trained and selected by 
the National Civil Service Authority (Autoridad Nacional del Servicio Civil, SERVIR), subject to 
norms established by Law No. 30057 (Ley N°30057, Ley de Servicio Civil), with administrative or 
management responsibilities and a higher salary (funds from which were drawn from a special 
fund) than prison staff. 
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key administrative positions, valuing penitentiary staff through recognition of 
their work.131 
In November 2012, the last strike of prison staff took place, lasting 19 days 
and involving negotiation with staff of the Ministry of the Economy.132  
Improvement in relations with prison staff contributed to the stability of 
management, given that one of the principal causes of the removal of the 
directors of INPE were the frequent occurrence of strikes or acts of violence 
within detention centers.133  From the early 1990s until 2011, the average period 
of service for the president of INPE was just eight months.  With the Penitentiary 
Reform Process, from 2011 until 2019, there have been only four presidents of 
the institution.  Further, no one has left the presidency as the result of problems 
with prison management.134 
D.  Improvements in the Management of Information 
Until 2011, statistical reports of INPE were limited to registering prison 
population, level of overcrowding, and the sex and legal status of detainees.135  
Beginning in 2011, INPE implemented integrated prison registry policies, 
leading to concrete improvements in statistical methodologies, permitting the 
production of monthly reports with a broad range of indicators such as period of 
detention, particular crimes committed, place of origin, reason for incarceration 
and release, rate of recidivism, etc.136  These data, in turn, allowed for a more 
thorough criminological analysis of detainees and enabled informed decision 
making.137  It became possible to develop a map of criminogenic exposure 
 
 131. Resolución de Presidencia Ejecutiva No. 163-2012-SERVIR-PE, Normas Legales 
549237 (Nov. 28, 2012), https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/asignan-profesionales-del-
cuerpo-de-gerentes-publicos-en-div-resolucion-n-163-2012-servir-pe-872790-3/. 
 132. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, COMUNICADO NO. 29 – 2012 INPE, 
ANTE HUELGA INDEFINIDA INPE INFORMA SOBRE GESTIONES REALIZADAS E INSTA A LA 
REANUDACIÓN DE LABORES (2012). 
 133. El Sistema Penitenciario: Componente Clave de la Seguridad y la Política Criminal. 
Problemas, Retos y Perspectivas, Informe Defensorial Nº 154-2011/DP DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO 
51–52 (2011); See Berdugo, supra note 99, at 45. 
 134. The President of INPE who initiated the reform (after three and a half years in office) left 
the position when he was designated Minister of the Interior.  The second INPE president (after a 
year and a half) left the position due to a change in the national government.  The third (after and 
year and a half in the position) left due to allegations of improprieties prior to his service with INPE. 
 135. Statistical Reports 2010- Statistics, INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO-PERU (2019), 
https://www.inpe.gob.pe/estad%C3%ADstica1.html. 
 136. Statistical Reports 2012- Statistics, INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO-PERU (2019), 
https://www.inpe.gob.pe/estad%C3%ADstica1.html. 
 137. See INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO- INPE, INFORME ESTADÍSTICO DICIEMBRE 3 
(2012); see also Lucía Nunovero Cisneros, Quel Avenir pour les Mesures Alternatives á 
L’incarération dans la Démarche Politco-criminelle Péruvienne?, 35 ARCHIVES DE POLITIQUE 
CRIMINELLE 249 (2013). 
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(“exposición criminógena”).138  This map showed the specific areas with the 
greatest concentration of prison population in the country, serving as the basis 
for social prevention measures.139 
E.  Maintenance of Physical Plant 
INPE promoted greater participation of inmates in the management of the 
physical plant of detention centers as a central element of the Prison Reform 
Process.  This policy began with improvements in the core spaces (cells, 
bathrooms, corridor lighting, patios used for visits, etc.), in the preparation of 
food, and in the cleaning and maintenance of discipline in cellblocks.  This was 
the first step in building confidence between inmates and staff, a means of 
making them co-responsible partners for order and peaceful coexistence, without 
ceding functional authority of the institution. 
The improvement in the physical plants began in Lurigancho, the largest and 
historically most problematic detention center, with committees and resources 
pooled by the inmates themselves.140  It extended to the majority of detention 
centers throughout the country, with the exception of the highest security centers 
operating in “special closed regime,” which limits inmate organization and their 
representation.141  Prior to this process, destruction of cellblocks and other 
structures in detention centers was common, particularly during disturbances 
and riots.142  Through this process, detainees not only ceased destruction of 
prison spaces, but also began to feel ownership in their own environment, 
developing a sense of belonging.143 
 
 138. See P. Wikström, Crime Propensity, Criminogenic Exposure and Crimen Involvement in 
Early to Mid-adolescence, MONATSSCHRIFT FUR KRIMINOLOGIE AND STRAFRECHTSREFORM, 92, 
253–266 (2009) (discussing the concept of criminogenic exposure); Prevención del Delito con 
Políticas Públicas Enfocadas en las Personas, CAF (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.caf.com/
es/actualidad/noticias/2014/09/prevencion-del-delito-con-politicas-enfocadas-en-las-personas/ 
(applying policies to Latin America). 
 139. INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO- INPE, INFORME ESTADÍSTICO DICIEMBRE 53 
(2016), https://www.inpe.gob.pe/normatividad/documentos/4295-informe-estadistico-diciembre-
2019/file.html (presenting data on Criminogenic exposure analysis for peruvian case in Lima 
neighborhoods). 
 140. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 3. 
 141. Camille Boutron, El Uso Estratégico del Espacio Carcelario como Elemento Referencial 
de la Construcción de Identidades en Conflicto en el Perú, BULLETIN D’INSTITUTE FRANCAIS 
T’ETUDES ANDINES, 43, 47 (2014). 
 142. See Muere un Tercer Preso Tras Incendio y Motín en Cárcel de Perú, Última Hora (Oct. 
12, 2015), https://www.ultimahora.com/muere-un-tercer-preso-incendio-y-motin-carcel-peru-
n938208.html. 
 143. An important factor that facilitated this new vision of the prions as “their” daily space was 
the interest of those deprived of liberty in receiving visits from family members in decent and 
hygienic spaces, despite the overcrowding, which at times reaches three times capacity.  In light of 
this, faced with the limited institutional budget to maintain detention centers, INPE authorized 
inmates to repair and improve their cellblocks.  This served not only to enhance the physical plant 
in which they lived but also fostered organization among inmates to maintain and care for living 
space in the detention center.  See also Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 61. 
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F.  Image of INPE 
An important commitment undertaken by the authorities and detainees 
through their representatives was the maintenance of order and peaceful 
coexistence within detention centers.144  This order and calm served not only to 
improve the quality of life within prisons but also to enhance the image of prison 
authorities and detainees in public opinion.145  That is, INPE worked to release 
information about the successes of the Prison Reform Process,146 with the 
understanding that this, in turn, would improve the chances of detainees seeking 
early release and other benefits from judicial authorities.147 
INPE promoted a transparent model of prison management, allowing 
journalists to enter detention centers and almost all parts of any given center.148  
This openness to media oversight served to convey the achievements of the 
Reform Process to the general public.149  The highest profile activities were 
those conducted at Lurigancho, the most emblematic prison in the country and 
also the largest, with some 10,000 detainees.150  What was most remarkable 
about the activities in Lurigancho is that they were taking place in a center which 
 
 144. As the Ombusdman reports show: Derechos Humanos y Sistema Penitenciario, 
Supervisión de Derechos Humanos de Personas Privadas de Libertad 1998–1999, Informe N° 29 
DEFENSORÍA DELF PUEBLO 7 (2000), https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/informe_29.pdf; Supervisión del Sistema Penitenciario 2006, Informe N°113 
DEFENSORÍA DELF PUEBLO 84 (2006). https://www2.congreso.gob.pe/Sicr/ApoyComisiones/
comision2011.nsf/021documentos/5115F08BFE6D1A3605258154005B2DCA/$FILE/Informe_N
_113.pdf. 
 145. See Nota de Prensa No. 368-2019-INPE, Internos del Penal de Lurigancho Participaron 
en Desfile Junto con Empresarios (2019), https://www.inpe.gob.pe/prensa/noticias/item/3083-
internos-del-penal-de-lurigancho-participaron-en-desfile-junto-con-empresarios.html; see also 
Nota de Prensa No. 271 -2018-INPE, Internos del Penal de Cañete Participan en Desfile Cívico 
Patriótico (2018), https://www.inpe.gob.pe/noticias-region-lima/item/1949-internos-del-ep-ca%
C3%B1ete-participan-de-desfile-c%C3%ADvico-patri%C3%B3tico.html 
 146. Nota de Prensa No. 04-2012-INPE, INPE Inicia Acciones de Rehabilitación con Internos 
de Alto Riesgo (2012), https://www.peru.gob.pe/docs/PLANES/182/PLAN_182_Nota_de_
Prensa_N%C2%BA04-2012-INPE_2012.pdf 
 147. Informe Penitenciario, Una Mirada al Mundo Carcelario Peruano, COMISIÓN 
EPISCOPAL DE ACCIÓN SOCIAL 71 (2006), https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/23775.pdf. 
 148. See Instituto Nacional Penitenciario, Notas de Prensa/Noticias, https://www.inpe.gob.pe/
prensa/noticias.html. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See generally FwichyGM, RELL PENAL DE LURIGANCHO + 1000 RECORD 
GUINNESS HD Cortito, YOUTUBE (Oct. 3, 2013), https://wwww.youtube.com/
watch?v=8JvskSE2zhY (showing the Guinness record of 1,000 inmates engaged in a Full-Body 
Fitness Program); Victor Candia, Internos de los penales de Lurigancho y Mujeres de Chorrillos 
participan en VIII Festival del Cajón, YOUTUBE (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=B9LWd6aaJbU (showing a performance by 1,000 inmates playing the Peruvian cajón, a 
percussion instrument, made by inmates in the detention center); Latina Noticias, Reos del penal 
Lurigancho escenifican el ‘Padre Nuestro’ para el papa Francisco, YOUTUBE (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-C241Z1rVP8 (showing a video of some 2,000 inmates 
playing for Pope Francis in 2018). 
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only a few years earlier was generally considered to be an uncontrollable, violent 
haven for hardened criminals.  It is worth highlighting that during the eight years 
of “Management by Dialogue”151 with inmates and of an open-door policy with 
media sources, not a single incident of violation of security was recorded.  By 
2020, detention centers in Peru had ceased to be a topic of sensationalist 
reporting, even by media sources known primarily for sensationalism. 
G.  Reduction of Violence 
In Latin America, there are no clear, universally accepted measures of 
violence in detention centers.  Still, the number of escapes, violent deaths, 
disturbances and riots are good indicators of violence within prisons.  In this 
regard, as we have noted, the Penitentiary Reform Process brought riots nearly 
completely to an end.  From  2011 until early 2020, there was a lone riot, in a 
small detention center (Challapalca, with 180 inmates) in late 2018.152 
In Peru, a riot (motín) may be defined as an instance of generalized 
indiscipline in a detention center.  This can be distinguished from a disturbance 
(reyerta), which is an instance of indiscipline or clashes involving inmates––
both between the authorities and inmates or between and among inmates––
limited to a single wing or cellblock.153  Disturbances, then, are events of lesser 
magnitude that are limited in scope and that do not spread to other areas of a 
detention center nor undermine the general internal security of the prison.154  In 
a riot, detainees generally seize control of the entire detention center to challenge 
authorities.155  This may occur when an uprising beginning in a particular 
cellblock gains the support of other inmates or when all cellblocks organize to 
revolt together.156  Further, riots generally prompt the intervention of other 
authorities and institutions, such as the Peruvian National Police (PNP), the Red 
 
 151. See Informe Sobre la Situación del Establecimiento Penitenciario de Réginmen Cerrado 
Ordinario Lurigancho, Defensoria del Pueblo 8–11 (1997), https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/informe_5.pdf (discussing violanec during the 90s); Política Nacional 
Penitenciaria y Plan Nacional de la Política Penitenciaria 2016–2020, GOB.PE 51 
https://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/3853016153F24A15052581290074
6BB1/$FILE/D.S.005-2016-JUS.pdf (regarding reduction of violence after 2011 as part of the 
assessment for the recent Decreto Supremo 005-2016-JUS). 
 152. It should be noted that in the riot in Challapalca in 2018, the inmates never seized control 
of the entire detention center; they were able to take over one wing of a cellblock and to take 
hostages.  The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo) and the 
Catholic Church intervened to resolve the crisis.  See Acaba sin Víctimas, supra note 108. 
 153. COMISION INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, INFORME SOBRE LOS 
DERECHOS HUMANOS DE LAS PERSONAS PRIVADAS DE LIBERTAD EN LAS AMÉICAS, OEA 36–39 
(2011). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. This is described in a 2011 report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 
The “motín” at Centro el Pavoncito in Guatemala in 2007  and “motín” en El Penal Frontón en Perú 
in 1986.  See Berdugo, supra note 99, at 34, 77. 
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Cross, the Ombudsperson, the Catholic Church, etc.157  They also generally 
involve the taking of hostages, deaths, serious injuries, the use of weapons and 
the setting of fires.158  That is, in a riot, the prison authorities lose control of the 
detention center.159 
In sum, in operational terms, we can say that a riot is a rupture of the established 
order in a detention center by inmates, frequently followed by the seizure of 
spaces, destruction of buildings and the taking of hostages.  There may be 
disorder, disputes and fights within particular areas or cellblocks (which we 
define as disturbances (reyertas), but these do not rise to the level of a riot, given 
their localized nature, the fact that they do not prompt the solidarity of other 
detainees, and the fact that they do not place at risk the internal security of the 
entire prison. 




 157. See El Papel Mediador de la Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia en Los Casos de 
Alteración del Orden Interno en Loas Centros de Reclusión, DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO DE 
COLOMBIA- INSTITUTIO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 5, 81–82, (2005), 
https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/24209.pdf 
 158. Medidas Privativas y no Privativas de la Libertad, El sistema penitenciario. Manual de 
instrucciones para la evaluación de la Justicia Penal, UNODC 25 (2010); El Papel Mediador, 
supra note 157, 81–82 (describing relevant cases). 
 159. The operational definition “prison riot occurs when prison authorities lose control of a 
significant number of prisoners in a significant area of the prison for a significant amount of time” 
is provided by Bert Useem and Anne M. Piehl, Prison Buildup and Disorder, 8 PUNISHMENT & 
SOCIETY 95 (2006). 
 160. Compiled by authors.  Based on Data from INPE (2019). 
2005 6 3 9
2006 6 6 12
2007 8 2 10
2008 5 8 13
2009 7 3 10
2010 8 1 9
2011 9 3 12
2012 3 3 6
2013 5 0 5
2014 3 0 3
2015 3 0 3
2016 8 0 8
2017 5 0 5
2018 6 1 7
YEAR DISTURBANCES RIOTS Total 
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To determine the number of riots and disturbances, we employed the 
definitions in the text of this article. 
The new institutional culture and rapid resolution of conflicts brought the 
reduction of riots to historically low levels in Peruvian prisons.  As can be seen 
in Table 3, in some years, there were no riots in the country, despite historically 
unprecedented, high levels of overcrowding. 
 
Table 4.  Deaths in Penitentiaries in Peru, 2012–2018.161 
 
Another of the facts frequently considered by the international literature as an 
indicator of prison insecurity is the occurrence of violent deaths inside 
prisons.162  As shown in Table 4, between 2012 and 2018, deaths from violent 
acts were reduced from 18 to 8.163  This latter figure is fairly low, particularly in 
light of the consistent growth in the prison population over that six-year 
period.164  Moreover, for many years prior to the Prison Reform Process, it was 
common for guards to find firearms (pistols, machine guns, war grenades, etc.) 
during searches.  In this period, “security” of the pavilions meant having their 
own weapons to protect themselves from the attacks of other pavilions.165  It 
should be noted that between 2013 and 2019 there were no incidents of shots 
fired inside Peruvian prisons.166  Lurigancho, for example, as Postema, 
Cavallaro and Nagra observed, “has been transformed from an institution 
 
 161. Based on data of INPE (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario, 2019).  Figures prior to 2012 are 
not reliable due to the narrow scope of data collected.  See, supra Section IV.D. 
 162. Daniel P. Mears & Jamie Watson, Towards a Fair and Balanced Assessment of Supermax 
Prisons, 23 JUST. Q. 232, 242 (2006). 
 163. See Table 4. 
 164. Nunovero Cisneros, Factores de Aumento, supra note 107, at 13. 
 165. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, n.10. 
 166. See Table 4. 


















2012 163 18 12 193 9.3% 3411 
2013 179 22 3 204 10.8% 3073 
2014 220 10 12 242 4.1% 7196 
2015 151 6 39 196 3.1% 12874 
2016 212 9 17 238 3.8% 9114 
2017 245 14 10 269 5.2% 6099 
2018 214 8 34 256 3.1% 11367 
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characterized by rampant violence in a setting of unhygienic anarchy, to a 
controlled system in which authorities and inmates communicate and foster non-
violent coexistence within the prison.”167 
  
 
 167. Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 61. 
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Table 5: Escapes from the Peruvian Penitentiary System, 2005–2018 
 
*Based on data from INPE (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario, 2019) 
On August 15, 2007, there was an earthquake in Lima that destroyed most of 
the Chincha prison (686 inmates), including the perimeter wall, facilitating the 
escape of inmates from the prison.  Many remained in the detention center; 
others were recaptured shortly thereafter in the immediate vicinity of the 
prison.168 
Finally, between 2013 and 2018, there was a significant decrease in escapes, 
both from inside detention centers and from outside the walls of a prison (for 
instance, from a penitentiary hospital, from a judicial proceeding, or during 
transport to a hospital or court).  In 2013, not a single escape from a prison was 
registered, the first time a year transpired without an escape in the history or the 
records of Peruvian prisons.169  As shown in Table 5, this decrease generated an 
increasingly favorable ratio of escapes per prison population, since the prison 
population continued to increase rapidly, and the escapes remained at low 
levels.170  In 2015, for example, a single inmate escaped from a prison.  In 2018, 
no escapes were recorded from outside the prison (again, during judicial 
proceedings, transfer, from a hospital, etc.).171 
 
 168. Regresan a la Cárcel 242 Presos Peruanos que se Fugaron Tras el Terremoto, EL PAÍS, 
Aug. 24, 2007, https://elpais.com/internacional/2007/08/25/actualidad/1187992801_850215.html 
 169. Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, supra note 112, at 62. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Table 5. 




TOTAL PRISON POPULATION 
RATIO— 
N° OF ESCAPES 
/PRISON 
POPULATION 
2005 19 18 37 33,594 1,768 
2006 38 10 48 37,445 985 
2007* 33 14 47 41,546 1,259 
2008 33 8 41 43,466 1,317 
2009 58 8 66 44,254 763 
2010 9 5 14 46,198 5,133 
2011 19 8 27 52,700 2,774 
2012 38 3 41 61,390 1,616 
2013 0 9 9 67,597 0 Fugas 
2014 3 3 6 71,961 23,987 
2015 1 3 4 77,242 77,242 
2016 9 4 13 82,023 9,114 
2017 5 4 9 85,811 17,162 
2018 7 0 7 90,934 12,991 
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H.  The Four Models of Penitentiary Management in Peru 
The consolidation of a new approach to prison management in Peru, which 
led to the reduction of intra-prison violence, contrasts sharply with the self-rule 
of inmates, which was, unfortunately, the previous norm in Peruvian detention 
centers.  The Prison Reform Process of 2011 was based on an appreciation of 
the history and nature of inmate self-rule, a system of control shaped by the 
consolidated organization of inmates and a prison culture that arose from the 
criminal culture of the “faites” (traditional leaders in Peruvian criminality).172  
Based on an understanding of this history, and with a humanistic vision that 
respected the citizenship of inmates, the Reform Process emphasized dialogue 
with detainees, recognizing them as actors and protagonists in prison 
management.173  The team that led the INPE in those years understood not only 
central aspects of prison management but also prison culture.  As a result, they 
fostered a tripartite model of dialogue that formed the basis of the new 
management: from a) the INPE presidency (or its regional representatives) 
towards b) the directors of each penitentiary establishment, and c) the 
representatives of the inmates.174  In the past, communication with the 
organization of inmates was limited to agreements with the directors of 
individual detention centers (often in extra-legal agreements).175  With the 
Reform Process, communication would involve the participation of the INPE 
management team, who visited the system’s detention centers regularly to talk 
with the representatives of the inmates.176  After interventions and dialogue by 
the INPE leadership, the detention center directors would be responsible for 
monitoring and overseeing the peaceful coexistence agreements reached and 




 172. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 174–85. 
 173. Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 62 
 174. See El Sistema Penitenciario, supra note 133, at 223. 
 175. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 187–88. 
 176. Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, supra note 112, at 124. 
 177. As pointed by Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 61–62. 
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Graph 5:  Types of Relationships Between and Among Prison Actors 
 
In effect, a different vision of prison management was adopted when engaging 
the various actors involved, all of whom agreed to cooperate with the Reform 
Process, according to their function.  For many years, prison officials had 
worked in an autonomous manner, viewing inmates as their opponents, with 
predictably poor results.178  In 2011, INPE undertook a new approach, in a 
context of limited resources (rendering expansion of security, treatment 
programs and infrastructure improvement impossible).179  The Prison Reform 
Process acted to strengthen the links between INPE management and prison 
staff, generating greater commitment from all and fostering a sense of belonging 
to the institution.  INPE provided visibility to the representatives of the existing 
internal organizations, which had existed for many years.  This visibility and 
recognition given to the inmates’ representatives launched a process by which 
these leaders seized the protagonist role from the clandestine leadership centered 
on the Taitas (leaders of the largest criminal groups in the prison who, until then, 
had exercised unchallenged control over the inmates in their cellblocks).  The 
new leaders would be the delegates (delegados), elected by all inmates.  In this 
way, the delegate became the person with representative force before other 
inmates and prison authorities.  It is worth emphasizing here that the importance 
and power of delegates varied significantly from prison to prison: in Lurigancho, 
delegates became managers of coexistence, while in Ancón II, the delegate was 
a mere spokesman.180 
 
 178. A handbook addressing this problem was published in 2008.  MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA-
INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENIENTENCIARIO, MANUAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS APLICADOS A LA 
FUNCIÓN PENITENCIARIA 10 (2008). 
 179. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 10 MEDIDAS DE REFORMA DEL 
SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO 1 (2012), http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/
810635CDF2139A7F052581300073F277/$FILE,10_medidas.pdf. 
 180. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 185-93; López Noam 
y Espinozan Gelin, Democracia Entre Rejas: Representación y Elecciones en el Penal de 
Lurigancho, en PERÚELECCIONES 18 (19), 135-37 (2019). 
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The Reform Process prioritized the Institutional Government model, 
eliminating entirely so-called “liberated areas” (tierras liberadas).181  Our 
baseline point of departure (both for employees and inmates), posits that the 
management of detention centers should be within the exclusive power of the 
penitentiary authorities.  What remained to be determined was how best to 
exercise that authority in light of the population and criminological reality of 
each detention center.  We contend that one of the fundamental elements for 
reestablishing legitimate authority was the exercise of “Management by 
Dialogue” in those detention centers in which this approach was viable, without 
placing the security of any given center at risk.182  Below, we present the four 
management models as ideal types. 
Likewise, we explain that the INPE presidency established a style of 
differentiated management based on the security level of each detention center, 
the danger presented by the inmates, the criminological prognosis, and the 
center’s institutional capacity, which resulted in four ideal management models.  
One model was eliminated entirely from the prison system and serves as a 
negative reference.183  This is a “model” of a poorly managed detention 
center.184  The other three models continue in the Peruvian prison system.  As 
shown in Graph 6, beyond the “ordinary” and “special” prison regimes provided 
for in the Code of Sentence Enforcement (Código de Ejecución Penal), the 
reality of each detention center required the application of a particular model of 
prison management.  In maximum security centers such as Challapalca, a 
centralized prison authority was imposed, while in other centers, INPE 
leadership applied a protective model (in minimum security centers) and a co-
responsibility model (in the densely populated centers where exercising 
complete control would have been virtually impossible).  Thus, we can identify 
four models of prison management in Peru, based on two criteria: “Institutional 
Government” and “Management by Dialogue,” as we explain below. 
“Institutional Government” (IG) is the exercise of authority over all aspects 
of life in detention, as is ordinarily required by the relevant legal norms.  The 
extreme opposite of “Institutional Government” is the total lack of official 
authority, or “self-government” by the inmates, which almost inevitably 
devolves into self-rule by inmates.  In this sense, in terms of maximums and 
minimums, the maximum form of Institutional Government occurs when 
penitentiary authorities have all spaces and areas of prison life under their 
control (whether by means of authority or dialogue); the minimum degree of 
 
 181. El Sistema Penitenciario, supra note 133, at 34–35 (describing “Tierras libeadas”). 
 182. See PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 45 (describing 
prison operations from 1987–1992 in San Juan de Lurigancho Prison in Lima while there were no 
guards in that prison). 
 183. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 3 (recognizing 
described in this work operated form 1987–1992 in San Juan de Lurigancho Prison in Lima while 
there were no guards in that prison). 
 184. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 3. 
400 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70:367 
Institutional Government occurs when penitentiary authorities practically 
abandon the prison or control nothing inside its walls, allowing inmates to 
assume the control function. 
“Management by Dialogue” is the regular practice by prison authorities of 
conversing and communicating with inmates (or their representatives) about the 
most important aspects of prison management, seeking their regular opinion and 
participation.  The maximum of “Management by Dialogue” occurs in detention 
centers in which dialogue is fluid and activities that involve inmates are 
coordinated with them (whether for institutional or illegal purposes).  The 
minimum level of Management by Dialogue exists in prisons in which there is 
no dialogue or coordination with inmates, either because the inmates, in fact, 
control the prison and have no interest in dialogue, or because the prison 
authority has total control and feels no need to coordinate anything with the 
inmates. 
It should be noted that to establish the new management models, it was first 
necessary to achieve comprehensive control of all areas of the country’s prisons 
and to reestablish legitimate authority. 
 
Graph 6:  Degrees of Institutional Government 
 
1.  Total Control of the Institution 
The Challapalca Penitentiary is the best example of this type of center.  
Challapalca is located at some 13,000 feet or 4,000 meters above sea level and 
is operated as a “special closed regime” center.185  Challapalca holds a relatively 
 
 185. Informe Especial Sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en la Cárcel de 
Challapalca, Depertamento de Tanca, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118 COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS Doc. 3, no. 4 (2003). 
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small population (150–180 detainees) and has no overcrowding.186  However, 
those deprived of liberty in this center had all been sentenced to long prison 
terms and were considered to be dangerous and uncooperative by Peruvian 
prison authorities.187  This regime focused on security, rather than treatment 
programs (which, though lower in priority, continued).  The representation or 
organization of the inmates was prohibited, as was transit between cellblocks.188  
Visits and time for recreation (“patio”) were also highly regulated.189  The staff 
was adequate, with emphasis on prison security.  Prison guards at Challapalca 
received a special bonus for working there.190  In addition, the center had 
recently remodeled infrastructure that was maintained in good condition.191  
This model of total institutional control was also applied in a large part of Ancón 
I (Piedras Gordas), and in a substantial part of the Cochamarca Penitentiary, as 
well as in areas housing detainees in the “special closed regime” in other prisons 
in the country.192 
2.  Guardianship Model 
This model is found at the minimum security Ancón II Penitentiary whose 
population (about 1,500 inmates) was made up mainly of young offenders 
detained for non-violent crimes.193  Ancón II was a new center without 
overcrowding and with excellent infrastructure and adequate resources for 
prison treatment programs and security.194  The center maintained a strict 
division between cellblocks and segregated areas for particular groups, such as 
foreign nationals (generally held for drug trafficking), elderly inmates, 
 
 186. INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO- INPE, INFORME ESTADÍSTICO DICIEMBRE 12 
(2016). 
 187. Informe Especial, supra note 185, at 27. 
 188. Art.63 Reglamento: Aprobado Mediante Decreto Supremo N15-2003-JUS, CONDIGO DE 
EJECUCIÓN PENAL (September 11, 2003), https://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_
uibd.nsf/D04A8DAD08FE381A05257BF8008222BA/$FILE/18.pdf. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Inversión en las mejoras de los centros penitenciarios demandaron una inversión 




 192. Art.62 Reglamento: Aprobado Mediante Decreto Supremo N15-2003-JUS, CONDIGO DE 
EJECUCIÓN PENAL (September 11, 2003), https://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_
uibd.nsf/D04A8DAD08FE381A05257BF8008222BA/$FILE/18.pdf. 
 193. INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO- INPE, INFORME ESTADÍSTICO DICIEMBRE 11, 34 
(2016). 
 194. UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE- BID-OPEN SOCIETY, PROGRAMA DE TRATAMIENTO C.R.E.O. 
Y F.O.CO.S.-PERU, http://cesc.uchile.cl/buenaspracticasenprevencion/bbp_docs/29_programa_
de_tratamiento_CREO_y_FOCOS.pdf. 
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evangelical groups, and women charged with terrorist offenses.195  In this model, 
with relatively sophisticated separation based on criminological classification 
and limited movement within the center by inmates, it was possible to implement 
differentiated treatment programs.  As a result, most of the activities and 
schedules were determined by prison authorities.196  This management model, 
which focused on robust treatment programs (education and work), was applied 
in most of the minimum-security pavilions in the prison system, which had 
populations amenable to rehabilitation and sufficient personnel and 
infrastructure to accommodate rehabilitative programming. 
3.  Co-responsibility Model 
This model is found most clearly at the Lurigancho Penitentiary (ordinary, 
closed regime), which held over 10,000 detainees—more than three times 
capacity—with outdated infrastructure and insufficient staff.197  Although 
Lurigancho was a detention center considered to be operating in the “ordinary 
regime” classification, a significant part of the population had long criminal 
histories and had been sentenced to many years in prison.198  In this type of 
detention center, inmate organizations remained active.199  As a result, it was not 
possible for the institution to regulate all aspects of daily life (as in Challapalca 
or Ancón II).200  Thus, it was necessary to work with the inmates and well-
structured intra-prison organizations to achieve a model of management that 
“incorporated” in a regulated fashion the inmates’ delegates in the management 
of the prison.  This was particularly the case with the norms of cohabitation and 
coexistence in the cellblocks.  This is, therefore, a model focused on the co-
responsibility and dialogue between and among the actors involved.  The model 
was applied in other centers, especially those with high levels of overcrowding, 
limited staff, and representative organizations of those deprived of liberty.  
Detention centers with these conditions constituted the majority of the Peruvian 
Prison System.201  In these circumstances, the Prison Reform Process focused 
on eliminating entirely the trafficking of drugs and prohibited items, low-level 
 
 195. Retos del Sistema Penitenciario Peruano: Un diagnóstico de la realidad carcelaria de 
las mujeres y varones. Resumen ejecutivo, Informe de Adjuntía Nº 006-2018-DP/ADHPD 39 
(2018). 
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and mid-level corruption, physical abuse between inmates, etc.202  
Implementation of the co-responsibility model led to significant reductions in 
the levels of violence within detention centers, incidents of collective violence, 
escape attempts, violent deaths and riots, use of firearms, and the taking of 
hostages.203  In 2017, INPE assumed responsibility for Lurigancho, after 30 
years under the control of the National Police.204  This model was applied in 
most detention centers in Peru.205 
4.  Self-Rule by Inmates 
Self-rule by inmates was perhaps the defining characteristic of the Lurigancho 
Penitentiary in the 1990s.206  This model no longer exists in the Peruvian prison 
system in practice.  We include it here as a model type because it is one that 
existed for years in Peru but which should never return.  This model involved 
the complete control by inmates faced with a prison institution that was 
practically non-existent.207  The National Police, given the responsibility for 
Lurigancho, limited their role to the external control of the prison, ceding to the 
inmates full authority over the cellblocks.208  “Liberated zones” existed within 
the center in which authorities would not enter and where the inmates themselves 
oversaw all aspects of daily life, including control of food, alcohol, drugs, 
prohibited items, and the weapons and munitions in each cellblock.209 
Detainees in Lurigancho were overwhelmingly repeat offenders who brought 
to the prison their long criminal histories and cultures developed on the street.210  
Most faced long sentences, including life terms.211  At this time, the three centers 
in “special closed regime” had not yet been built.  Inmates were assigned to 
Lurigancho based on their place or neighborhood of origin because there was no 
penitentiary institution to classify those deprived of liberty according to accepted 
criminological methodology.212  Exceptions to the place of origin basis for 
grouping of inmates were made for areas occupied by those detained for drug 
trafficking and terrorism, ex-police and military officers, religious groups, and 
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other particular groups.213  This method of spatial organization facilitated the 
continuation of urban criminal subcultures, which were transferred from the 
streets to the prison, reproducing their customs, values and norms of 
coexistence.214  The self-rule of the prison was delimited by three criteria: 
territorial (according to the cellblock one belonged); group (according to the 
neighborhood of origin); and prestige (based on a hierarchy of crimes and 
criminality).215  This delimitation allowed for a degree of order and co-existence 
(i.e., ordered anarchy).  Internal conflicts were also managed based on these 
three criteria, with group and individual fragmentation, and tensions between 
consensus and conflict.216  Pérez Guadalupe has referred to these tensions as 
fusion and fission.217  This model of self-rule by inmates existed in the majority 
of detention centers in Peru in the 1990s as in previous decades, albeit in 
differing degrees.218 
As may be inferred, incorporating “Institutional Governance” with more 
“Management by Dialogue” in a significant number of detention centers 
required direct communication with the representatives of inmates, as well as 
their participation, in a controlled fashion, in certain aspects of prison 
administration.219  Internal organizations and their representatives (the 
delegates), once afforded tangible and formal representative roles, assumed 
responsibility for much of what happened in their cellblocks, both vis-à-vis the 
inmates who had elected them as well as in relation to the prison authorities to 
whom they were required to account for their actions.220  This responsibility did 
not exempt delegates from the rules of the detention center.  Some still 
committed violations.221  Indeed, a good number were transferred to other 
prisons for disciplinary infractions.222 
A central element in this long process of prison pacification and governance 
has been respect for the basic human rights of those deprived of liberty.  We 
consider this to be a sine qua non condition, necessary to establish and rebuild 
mutual confidence between staff and detainees.  As such, it constituted the basis 
on which further relationships could be built.  It was thus necessary to convince 
prison staff that respect for human rights had to be the point of departure for 
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coexistence-grounded dialogue.223  To do so, prison guards and staff had to 
accept that dialogue and mutual respect could be promoted without sacrificing 
the authority of staff and administrators.  Respect for human rights and dialogue 
allowed for the construction of an institutional climate in which the support of 
detainees for peaceful coexistence became possible, a climate in which inmates 
became agents co-responsible for the good governance of prisons.  As a result, 
a new institutional culture blossomed, one with a different type of relationship 
between staff and inmates.224  This relationship has continued to the present with 
the new prison authorities.  It is important to note that the new form of 
management did not involve hostility directed against inmate organizations but 
rather opposed “self-rule” by inmates.  The process served to challenge and 
eliminate inmate self-rule while incorporating the organization of inmates.225  
Nor did this process imply an abandonment of the institutional duties of INPE; 
instead, prison staff and management continued to act as authorities within 
detention centers.226 
It is worth nothing that the “co-responsibility model” was not applied across 
the board, but rather only in those prisons in which staff and administrators were 
not able to effectively control all aspects of the daily life of detainees.227  In 
some prisons, this model was applied partially, or other models were applied.  
That is, the Prison Reform Process distinguished four models in Peru (three of 
which have been employed, the fourth of which has been prohibited).  The 
Process assessed the context in each detention center and applied the most 
effective model, as is shown in Graph 6.  In addition, the fact that prison 
administration was in the hands of civilians (and not military or police) 
generated an understanding of management of detention centers quite different 
from the typical police or military approach, one that had been the norm within 
INPE until mid-2011.228  Prior INPE leaders (police and military officers) had 
recognized the existence of organizations of inmates but had viewed them as 
exclusively dangerous and  threatening.229  The Prison Reform Process also 
involved a return to a civilian prison administration body (INPE) and a shift 
away from police/military orientation.  Since 2011, INPE has been led 
exclusively by civilians.230 
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 229. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 37. 
 230. See Política Nacional Penitenciaria, supra note 151. 
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We should emphasize that institutional control—the fundamental pillar of the 
Prison Reform Process—has continued to the present throughout the Peruvian 
prison system.  All detention spaces in the country are controlled (in varying 
degrees) by prison authorities.  There are no longer spaces ruled by inmates 
(“liberated spaces” or tierra liberada) as before, or as exist currently in prisons 
in Brazil, Venezuela, and other countries in the region.231  On the contrary, 
directors of detention centers are able to (and must) enter into any space within 
the prison they direct to assess conditions and respond as needed or to supervise 
activities.232  So, too, are other authorities––such as prosecutors and police––
able to enter as needed.233  Regular searches became a routine occurrence in 
detention centers throughout the country without significant resistance from 
detainees, who generally accept the necessity and legitimacy of this form of 
control by authorities.234  Opposition to searches is thus generally limited to 
those that involve abusive behavior by the Police Special Operations Group 
(Grupo de Operaciones Especiales, GOES).235 
One fundamental aspect of the Prison Reform Process is that the directors of 
INPE established and maintained positive relations not only within the system 
(with staff and inmates) but also with other societal actors.236  These included 
Chambers of Commerce, sporting associations, businesses, politicians, and 
others.  In this way, although detention centers were not a priority for the 
Ministry of Justice (to whom the INPE responds hierarchically), institutional 
confidence was successfully developed by the Prison Reform Process.  Evidence 
of this confidence can be found in the decision to place all prisons in Peru under 
the control of INPE (rather than the police)—a clear vote of confidence in the 
institution.237  That is, INPE went from being a problem for the justice sector (or 
a “thorn in its side” as one Minister would say about prison administration) to 
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being recognized for successful management of potential conflicts, despite 
inadequate budgets and overcrowding.238 
While the Peruvian prison system is still in the process of maintaining the 
gains achieved, it is fair to recognize not only the continuity of the changes but 
also their sustainability.  One key element of the desired sustainability is the 
reduction of violence within detention centers, which  allowed for improvements 
in social reinsertion policies and partnerships with civil society actors and 
institutions.239  One important project that has been consolidated in recent years 
is the “Productive Jails” (Cárceles Productivas), which promotes, jointly with 
industry, the installation of workshops in detention centers.240  This program has 
been important for detainees.  Now, rather than drawing resources from their 
families, those deprived of liberty have been able to contribute through income 
received from these workshops.  This has been possible due to the reduction in 
riots and disturbances.  Before the Prison Reform Process, detainees would often 
destroy workshops and machinery in protest against the institution.241  Now, 
those deprived of liberty see these workshops and machinery as their own and 
as a source of income that can help support their families, generating positive 
externalities.242 
Finally, almost a decade after the beginning of the Prison Reform Process in 
Peru, we should note some deficiencies that have yet to be overcome.  These 
deficiencies and abuses are more frequent in the most overcrowded centers with 
the fewest prison staff: Corruption: Despite the new policy of sanctions and 
disciplinary measures to oversee staff, INPE has not been able to end low-level 
and mid-level corruption in detention centers.  There continue to be a high 
number of legitimate complaints by family members that cite inappropriate 
demands for payment of “fees” by prison staff.  Nor has it been possible to end 
the trafficking of drugs, alcohol, and prohibited objects within cellblocks.  While 
true that family members have been caught on occasion trying to sneak 
contraband, such as mobile phones and drugs, into detention centers, in most 
cases of entry of prohibited goods, prison staff themselves are the primary 
suspects.  Informal real estate market: Due to the high level of overcrowding in 
some prisons, cell space is sold or rented.  While the detention center determines 
the cellblock to which a given inmate is admitted, it is often unable to guarantee 
that inmate a place within a given cell.  In the case of threats to the physical 
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integrity of particularly vulnerable inmates, generally each detention center will 
have designated areas outside the ordinary cellblocks.  Often, inmates must pay 
illegal charges to access these areas. 
Aggressions: While the frequency of sexual abuse and killings has fallen 
considerably and means of reporting abuse have been improved, severe 
overcrowding has increased levels of tension within detention centers, creating 
dangerous conditions.  One means of controlling intra-cellblock and intra-cell 
violence has been to establish “discipline delegates,” responsible for ensuring 
order and ending disputes between and among detainees. 
As may be seen, overcrowding, which has intensified in recent years, is the 
underlying cause of a series of related problems that generate a loss of 
institutional authority.  As a result, in some cellblocks, the risk that co-
responsibility will degenerate into “apparent management” or to self-rule by 
inmates exists, as we shall see below. 
IV.  PRISON GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA: BETWEEN ABUSE BY PRISON 
AUTHORITIES AND SELF-RULE BY INMATES 
We propose “Prison Governance” as a potentially transformative concept to 
reorient prison management in Latin America, based on the Peruvian Prison 
Reform Process of 2011, as well as our understanding of detention centers in the 
region.  We understand Prison Governance to be the ability to manage 
problematic detention centers in an integral manner through the commitment of 
all actors—prison staff, administrators, and inmates—involved.  As François 
Vallaeys writes, “Governance begins when government is no longer possible; 
that is, when actors must together regulate their actions . . . . Governance 
produces agreements based on co-responsibility.”243  In this regard, the need for 
this type of prison management becomes apparent when authorities recognize 
that, in practice, they are unable to maintain control of those detained, either due 
to excessive population or to some other institutional shortcoming.  Faced with 
this challenge, we argue, governance models should incorporate into prison 
management the organic association of inmates but not their self-rule.244  Herein 
lies the secret and the inflection point of this model, given that the line between 
self-organization and self-rule is quite delicate. 
Because we assert that the only legitimate authority should be the legally 
constituted authority—provided it is rights-respecting and acts in accordance 
with the rule of law and human rights—we avoid the terms “co-government” or 
“co-management” to define the role of persons deprived of liberty in the Prison 
Governance Model.  That said, we support the co-responsible inclusion of the 
organization of inmates as valid actors in the development of daily life in the 
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detention center.  In this regard, inmates participate and dialogue with prison 
authorities in an exercise of “detention center citizenship.”  After conversing 
with the representatives of the inmates and discussing different possible options 
to improve management of the detention center, prison authorities decide which 
measures are most viable.  Together, prison authorities, staff, delegates, and 
inmates, apply the agreed upon measures.  Central in this process of dialogue is 
the determination, by consensus, as to which actions will improve and which 
will undermine the quality of life of those deprived of liberty in the detention 
center.  Our goal here is to suggest a new model of prison management based on 
consensus, rather than conflict, between and among the principal actors in the 
detention center—prison staff and detainees.  Once their shared interests are 
recognized (peaceful co-existence, better services, transfers, elimination of 
abuses, etc.), joint actions to achieve these goals may be defined.  Observers 
from civil society, the Red Cross, and religious groups may participate in this 
process as guarantors of the good faith of all involved, provided they are seen as 
credible actors by prison staff and detainees.  In this regard, “prison governance” 
was developed based primarily on the experience at the Lurigancho Penitentiary, 
in which the Peruvian Prison Reform Process was applied through regular 
dialogue with the president of INPE and his closest advisors, on the one hand, 
and the delegates, who collectively represented some 10,000 inmates, on the 
other.245 
As the Peruvian case study demonstrates, institutional objectives can be 
achieved by incorporating the views of inmates regarding the management of 
the detention center.246  The governance model constitutes an alternative to the 
typical models—authoritarian administration at one extreme and the absence of 
official authority on the other—that have been dominant in Latin America.247  
The Prison Governance model indentifies the administrative, logistical, and 
security capacity of each detention center.  As such, this model is consistent with 
what Bryans refers to as the creation of a secure and protected detention center 
by means of a positive, ethical contribution from staff and detainees to the joint 
objectives of the community.248 
On the other hand, it is important to distinguish “Prison Governance” from 
what Darke has described in Brazilian prisons (and Peirce in Dominican ones) 
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as “prison co-government.”249  “Co-government” in these prisons is the result of 
negotiation of order and convenience between prison administrators and de facto 
prison leaders, generally gang and organized crime figures.250 
The differences between and among detention centers, the level of 
organization that inmates achieve, as well as the modes of interaction with prison 
administrators may be seen in the four historic types of prison administration in 
Latin America proposed in Graph 7 below.  These are ideal types of prison 
management or administration, applying the same axis as in the Peruvian case 
(greater or lesser degrees of “Institutional Government” and “Management by 
Dialogue”) to classify detention centers in the Americas.  These four ideal 
models may be used to assess detention centers that are extremely difficult to 
control, the focus of this article.  Obviously, one cannot generalize any one of 
these models to particular countries in light of the fact that, within a given 
country, one finds varied realities across detention centers.  That said, we believe 
that one can apply “Prison Governance” in those detention centers that suffer 
from extreme overcrowding (generally macro-prisons) and have become 
ungovernable by ordinary prison administration.  Further, given the need for 
short-term solutions to the many challenges posed by overcrowded, 
ungovernable prisons, the “Prison Governance” model offers the possibility of 
reducing levels of violence through the gradual, rational incorporation of inmate 
organizations into management as an intermediate goal on the path to recovery 
of legitimate, rights-based, rehabilitation-focused management. 
It is worth noting that these four proposed types correspond to “extraordinary” 
detention centers (even though they may constitute the majority in some 
countries), in which ordinary prison administration that complies with legal 
norms is not possible.  In light of the failures of prison authorities in Latin 
America to manage detention centers in accordance with legal standards and 




 249. SACHA DARKE, CONVIVIALITY AND SURVIVAL: CO-PRODUCING BRAZILIAN PRISON 
ORDER (2018); Weegels, supra note 74; Peirce, supra note 75, at 6. 
 250. SACHA DARKE, CONVIVIALITY AND SURVIVAL: CO-PRODUCING BRAZILIAN PRISON 
ORDER (2018); Julienne Weegels, Prison Riots in Nicaragua: Negotiating Co-Governance Amid 
Creative Violence and Public Secrecy, INT’L CRIM JUSTICE REV. 62 (2020); Peirce, supra note 75, 
at 6. 
 251. Astrid Arrarás and Emily D. Bello-Pardo, supra note 31, at 6-9. 
Fall 2021] Towards a Governance Model of Ungovernable Prisons 411 
 
Graph 7:  Models of Prison Management in Latin America 
 
A.  Authoritarian Administration (Absolute Control) 
We find this model in centers where the institutional authorities exercise their 
authority, but with dehumanizing excesses and/or violence.  Prison staff control 
all the space and time of detainees who lose the ability to decide over basic 
aspects of their own daily life.  The institution produces and enforces rigid rules 
and guidelines.  Generally, this model is applied in prisons with inmates held for 
serious crimes.  There are generally a large number of staff, most of whom are 
focused on security.  Those deprived of liberty are frequently dehumanized, 
sometimes through illegal violence; the prison is understood as a space of 
punishment and not rehabilitation. 
The main rationale driving this type of administration is the search for security 
when faced with a prison population considered dangerous.  Whether due to 
logic based on prevention, fear, or repression, staff exercise maximalist 
measures of control to avoid any possible violation of internal rules.  While there 
is an effective “Institutional Government,” the risk of a violent reaction by 
inmates is great.  If staffing is not adequate in number or capacity, detention 
centers in this model may be time bombs that can result in enormous death and 
damage if detonated. 
B.  Abdication of Management (Self-Rule by Inmates) 
This model is found in those prisons where the institutional authorities, in 
practice, have renounced or abdicated their responsibility to manage all or part 
of a given detention center.  The institution limits its role to external security 
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(control of the perimeter of the prison or of cellblocks) and undertakes only 
limited actions within the walls of the center.  A clear indication of this type of 
model are the so-called “liberated zones” or inmates’ zones in which staff are 
not able to enter or may only enter with the permission of the inmates.  That is, 
staff have lost authority vis-à-vis inmates.  Ordinarily, criminal gangs, drug 
cartels, or other criminal organizations dispute leadership of the prison; for as 
long as a group has seized leadership, it exercises control over the self-
government or self-rule.  Generally speaking, it is not the case that authorities 
do not wish to control the detention center; they are not able to do so.  One 
example of this interest in recovering authority, coupled with failure to exercise 
control successfully, is the practice of extraordinary raids carried out by special 
quasi-military police forces.  While momentarily successful in establishing the 
control of authorities, once these forces have left the prison, self-rule continues 
as before. 
There are many explanations of how centers reach this extreme situation: lack 
of adequate staffing; the high level of danger of inmates; long sentences; fear of 
reprisals from affiliates of inmates outside the detention center; etc.  All these 
factors add up to the inability of prison authorities and staff to control the 
detention center.  The security risks in this model are high, given that detainees 
are allowed to continue criminal activity from within the detention center.  At 
any moment, these centers may experience escape attempts, violent deaths, 
vendettas, riots or the taking of hostages. 
C.  Apparent Administration (Co-Government) 
This model is found in detention centers in which the institution opts not to 
exercise its functions, preferring to feign compliance with prison system norms.  
Authorities do not completely lose control of detention centers but allow inmates 
to govern cellblocks provided that they do not cause problems.  It may be that 
the institution has adequate budget and personnel to run the prison, but the staff 
decide not to exercise authority out of fear or convenience or because they 
receive payoffs to look the other way.  That is, it is not that the staff are unable 
to take control of the detention center; rather, they prefer not to do so.  In this 
case, one may speak of co-government, given that this model involves 
coordination between staff and detainees, which is interrupted when there is an 
uprising or riot.  The arrangement between staff and inmates may also be 
suspended temporarily when a high-ranking authority comes to the center. 
The principal force behind this model is corruption, in the broadest sense, not 
only in the form of payments that staff receive from inmates, but also because 
these public servants fail to do the work that society has entrusted to them.  The 
risk of violence, escapes, and riots is severe in this model because, as in the case 
of the “Abdication of Management (self-rule)” model, inmates are able to 
continue to engage in criminal behavior from inside the prison, generating 
illegality and violence outside the detention center. 
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D.  Prison Governance (Dialogue and Citizenship) 
We find this model in those detention centers in which prison authorities 
recognize that the conditions in the prison are such that traditional means of 
administration will not be possible.  The conditions that lead authorities to this 
conclusion include poor infrastructure, overcrowding, deficient services, limited 
personnel, and limited resources.  Rather than applying one of the other three 
models listed above, authorities seek to incorporate inmates’ organizations—but 
not their self-rule—into prison management in concrete areas related to daily 
life in the detention center as a means of achieving peaceful coexistence.  This 
model has proven to be viable not only in centers with first-time offenders but 
also in prisons with repeat and violent offenders.  The principal motivating factor 
prompting the application of this model is the inability to control all aspects of 
the institution.  Instead of relying on repression (“Authoritarian 
Administration”) or abandoning detainees to their own fate (“Abdication of 
Management” or “Self-rule by Inmates”), authorities may opt for “Management 
by Dialogue,” engaging with the organic inmate organizations and recognizing 
prison citizenship.  If this type of model is well implemented, the risks of 
violence may be reduced significantly but are not entirely eliminated.  Even if it 
is not possible to eradicate abusive conduct among detainees, traffic in 
contraband, and micro-corruption by staff, if levels of violence are reduced and 
living conditions for inmates are improved, “Institutional Government” becomes 
more likely. 
Crossing the two axes and variables, “Institutional Government” and 
“Management by Dialogue,” we find different models of prison governance, 
depending on the exact point of the maximums and minimums in each quadrant.  
In this regard, it is important to appreciate where in this continuum we should 
locate a given detention center, as well as where that center seeks to locate itself 
in a given period of time and with given resources.  This framework also allows 
us to understand various arrangements that exist between authorities and 
detainees, as well as between authorities and gangs and other organized criminal 
groups in detention centers throughout Latin America, such as in Brazil, 
Nicaragua or the Dominican Republic.252 
In addition, it should be noted that one may find more than one management 
model within a single detention center, particularly larger centers in which 
detainees of various security levels are separated into different cellblocks or 
sections of a prison.  Separation within detention centers may also occur based 
on affiliation with gangs or other organized criminal groups, leading to the 
development or adoption of different models according to the nature of the 
particular population. 
As we have indicated earlier, the classification we outline above is based on 
an analysis of the administration of extreme and problematic detention centers 
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in Latin America, in which, due to a range of factors, ordinary management 
practices have failed.253  Unfortunately, this type of extreme and problematic 
center is not an exception in the Americas.  As a result, the “Prison Governance” 
model, which builds on the “co-responsibility” model in the Peruvian Prison 
Reform Process, goes beyond the ordinary management in which institutional 
objectives and prison rules provide the basis for administration.  In this model, 
there have been reductions in levels of violence and improvements in the quality 
of life within detention centers, facilitating rehabilitation and control of these 
problematic detention centers. 
 
Graph 8:  Prison Governance and Prison Management Models in Latin America 
 
Finally, as may be seen in Graph 8, “Prison Governance” is an alternative to 
the adoption of the “Authoritarian Administration” model, frequently the source 
of grave abuses of fundamental rights through its ultra-punitive approach, as 
described by De Dardel in Colombia,254 or the “Abdication of Management or 
Self-Rule of Inmates” model, which is nothing more than an abandonment of 
the responsibilities and functions on the part of the detention center. 
V  CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have outlined the most urgent problems facing prison 
systems in Latin America, focusing on the challenges presented by the most 
difficult detention centers—ones with violent offenders, gangs and criminal 
organizations, and limited staff and resources.  We have also detailed the 
experience of the Peruvian Prison Reform Process, which began in 2011 and 
continues to develop.255  This Reform Process led to the reduction of violence 
in detention centers, as well as the eradication of inmate self-rule, riots, gun 
battles, strikes by staff, and the taking of hostages.  It also led to a significant 
reduction in escape attempts and violent deaths.  As a result of this experience, 
we have proposed four models of prison management in Peru, focusing most 
attention on the “Co-responsibility Model.”256  Finally, using the same analytical 
categories—more or less “Institutional Government” and “Management by 
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Dialogue” —we identify four types of administration of unmanageable prisons 
found in Latin America.257 
While the advances achieved in the Peruvian Prison Reform Process should 
be the baseline in any penitentiary anywhere in the world, the truth is that these 
advances are not the norm in much of Latin America.  To appreciate how 
remarkable this achievement is, one need only consider the extraordinarily high 
rates of overcrowding in the majority of detention centers in the region and the 
levels of violence (attacks, deaths, suicides) in Latin American jails, prisons and 
penitentiaries.258  Further proof is found in the number or percentage of detention 
centers whose de facto control rests in the hands of inmates, and often, in hands 
of the most violent criminal organizations.259  While the four proposed models, 
both in the case of Peru and more generally in Latin America, are based on the 
concrete reality of penal institutions in the region, we have sought to emphasize 
a new management model, “Prison Governance,” based on the incorporation of 
the representation of inmates in the operation of detention centers. 
One may see that “Institutional Government” in prisons need not be in tension 
with “Management by Dialogue.”  Nor must one accept a false dichotomy 
between security and treatment programs.  Penitentiary officials need not choose 
one or the other; instead, they should think of maximums and minimums, based 
on the conditions present in any particular center.  As we have underscored, these 
models are not applicable to all penal institutions.  The model of “Prison 
Governance” may be applied to detention centers, which, from the general 
perspective of prison administration, are ungovernable.260  In certain conditions, 
the “Prison Governance” approach can constitute a reasonable alternative that 
may allow for the management of previously ungovernable centers.  We note 
here, that while there have been marked reductions in the levels of violence in 
centers in which the Prison Governance Model has been applied, it has not been 
possible to eliminate prison-on-prisoner violence entirely.  Nor has it been 
possible to eradicate trafficking in drugs and contraband or corruption by staff. 
No doubt, the “Prison Governance” model implies a change in the mentality 
of staff and the incorporation of inmates as actors in the peaceful management 
of detention centers.  The model also implies development of mutual confidence 
and trust between and among prison staff and those deprived of liberty.  It 
requires patience.  More than elaboration of norms, rules, or structures, this 
governance model is based on “Management by Dialogue,” in which prison 
administrators do not cede authority nor responsibility but rather act so as to 
encourage others to assume co-responsibility for the operation of the penal 
institution.  The first step in this process is the recognition of inmates as human 
beings with rights and responsibilities and the capacity to assist in achieving the 
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goals of the detention center.  Next, the model requires the involvement of prison 
staff, not only as security agents but also as agents of rehabilitation.  “Prison 
Governance” begins with a vision of penal institutions as centers of 
rehabilitation and not punishment.  As one of the core guiding principles of the 
Peruvian Prison Reform Process stated, “if you treat inmates like prisoners, they 
will respond like prisoners.  If you treat them like people, they will respond like 
people.”261 
The Peruvian experience has been studied by Postema, Cavallaro, and Nagra, 
who consider the incorporation of the controlled organization of detainees and 
the communication between detainees and authorities as central factors in the 
improvement in conditions in penal institutions in Peru.262  Further, those 
authors have noted that the application of the practices identified in Peru in other 
Latin American contexts (even in difficult centers) holds “the potential to 
transform prisons into institutions that are less violent, less abusive, and thus 
more rights-respecting and rehabilitative.”263  This does not mean that all 
problems have been resolved in centers like Lurigancho.  However, the 
successes are evident and provide hope for meaningful change in other 
problematic detention centers in Latin America. 
Finally, we close by observing that we do not propose “Prison Governance” 
as an ideal model for the operation of detention centers but instead as a 
provisional measure or intermediate approach.  The ideal model would involve 
detention centers at or below capacity with adequate, well-trained. and fairly 
paid professional staff, as well as infrastructure designed for social reinsertion, 
rather than the dehumanizing conditions one finds in many prisons in the 
Americas.  The ideal is the penal institution as a rehabilitative school, in which 
the institutional authorities exercise control over the center, but in which they do 
so with full respect for the basic rights of those deprived of liberty.  As long as 
we have penal institutions in Latin America with the characteristics that we see 
today—extreme overcrowding, high levels of violence, unsanitary and deficient 
infrastructure, and frequent control by violent gangs—management based on the 
“Prison Governance” model offers the possibility of improving the daily lives of 
detainees and prison staff.  To move in this direction, detention center 
administrators should incorporate rationally and progressively the voices of 
those detained. 
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VI.  EPILOGUE: COVID-19 UNDOES YEARS OF PROGRESS 
In early 2020, the coronavirus (COVID-19) ravaged countries and penal 
systems across the globe.264  Peru was no exception.265  By early March 2020, 
the country had registered its first case.266  As with most everything else that 
stood in its path, the nation’s prison and public health authorities, and by 
extension, the Peruvian Prison Reform Process, were outmatched by COVID-
19.  During March and April, analysts urged authorities in the penitentiary 
system and in public health to take measures to respond to the impending 
pandemic, both in general, but in particular, within closed, overcrowded 
detention centers, due to the special risks they posed.267  Little was done.268  
Officials took timid measures, underestimating the intensity of the virus and 
mismanaging and misrepresenting the intensity of the crisis.269  It did not take 
long for them to lose control of detention centers as well as the response to the 
broader national health crisis.270 
The unravelling began even before COVID-19 had taken its full, gruesome 
toll on the prison system.  While authorities downplayed the severe risks facing 
overcrowded detention centers with poor hygienic conditions and insufficient 
staff, detainees took matters into their own hands, instigating a series of protests 
and incidents.271  In northern Peru, on March 18, 2020, a full-blown riot took 
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hold in the Río Seco, Piura prison.272  The next day, an incident followed in the 
Picsi prison in Chiclayo that left two prison staff injured.  On March 22, a clash 
of detainees and an escape attempt resulted in three deaths at the El Milagro 
prison in Trujillo.273 
The national government responded by dismissing the three top members of 
the National Penitentiary Council (the President, Vice President, and a third 
member), the body responsible for overseeing prisons in Peru.274  While a visible 
measure with political impact, the removal of those familiar with the system, its 
organization, and the representation of detainees in different centers was not 
wise.  New leadership would assume control of a volatile situation in the midst 
of the worst public health crisis in generations and without the benefit of 
accumulated experience.  The new INPE president, Gerson Villar, lasted only 
six weeks at the helm of Peru’s prisons before being forced to resign.  During 
this brief period, over 1,000 inmates and hundreds of staff contracted COVID 
and riots killed nine at the Castro Castro prison in one of many violent 
incidents.275 
Not surprisingly, as COVID spread across Peru and in prisons, unrest 
intensified within detention centers.  New authorities lacked the personal 
relationships and knowhow that might have allowed them to dialogue with those 
deprived of liberty.  The climate of communication and respect was gone, 
replaced by hostility and mutual distrust.  In just over a month, the internal 
security and relative peace of the past decade within detention centers had 
disappeared.  By the end of April, there had been 15 disturbances and riots in 
prisons in Peru, principally in the most overcrowded and thus most dangerous 
centers.  The worst incident was at the Castro Castro penitentiary in Lima on 
April 27.  That uprising claimed the lives of nine detainees and caused injury to 
scores of others, including sixty staff and five police officers.  Including those 
killed in the Castro Castro riot, a total of thirteen people died in protests and riots 
in Peru’s prisons by April 30.  By that month’s end, there were 600 COVID 
cases registered among those incarcerated, with fifteen deaths. 276  While 
authorities took some measures to reduce overcrowding and relieve tensions,277 
these were insufficient to stop the spread of the disease or to quell unrest among 
those incarcerated. 
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By July, 300 of those incarcerated in Peru had died of COVID, as had 28 
prison staff.278  A process that had taken years of patient work had come undone.  
The mutual confidence that had been established over years disintegrated in a 
matter of days and weeks, as thousands of detainees and guards, locked in 
overcrowded, diseased centers, fought for their lives using whatever means they 
could.  The practices and patterns of behavior developed over a decade could 
not withstand the onslaught. 
Much of what went wrong can and should be attributed to the mismanagement 
of the authorities in power in early 2020.  Unlike their predecessors, with the 
notable exception in Lurigancho, explained below, they failed to consult with 
those directly affected.  They did not seek to govern collectively.  Instead, they 
underestimated COVID-19, made poor decisions, and failed to communicate 
clearly what was being done. 
Interestingly, Lurigancho, the center of the Peruvian Prison Reform Process, 
served as an exception to the mismanagement that afflicted the broader prison 
system.279  When the crisis began, Lurigancho shared the same risk factors that 
afflicted the system in general: overcrowding, understaffing, and resource 
deprivation.280  Indeed, on these measures, at roughly three times capacity, the 
prison was in a more severe state than almost all other centers.  Yet by all 
measures, Lurigancho outperformed other prisons in managing COVID and 
maintaining the peace.281  The director and delegates worked together closely 
from the beginning of the quarantine.  They implemented isolation protocols, 
purchased medicine and personal protective equipment, and worked through the 
sanitary emergency in a coordinated fashion.282  They took tests strategically 
(only 300 of the 10,000 detainees) and controlled the outbreak, while 
maintaining peace within the prison.283  The levels of COVID infection in the 
prison were no higher than among the non-incarcerated population.284 
In Peru, as in much of the world, the response to COVID-19 in detention 
centers in 2020 was woefully deficient.  In the United States—whose prisons 
should not be considered ideal by any means, and that has had among the highest 
per capita COVID rates in the world—levels of COVID infection were four 
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times higher in prisons than among the population in general.285  To expect swift 
and effective control of the pandemic inside Peru’s overcrowded and 
underfunded prison system would not be reasonable.  But the degree of 
mismanagement was stark, particularly in comparison to the successes achieved 
in the decade prior to the outbreak. 
Had there been an intelligent, cooperative response (as in Lurigancho), 
consistent with the animating principles of the Peruvian Prison Reform Process, 
disaster might well have been averted.  This article and the remarkable 
experience in Peru in the years preceding the disaster of 2020 strongly suggest 
that this is the case.  But, as with so much about the coronavirus, we can only 
imagine how the crisis might have been addressed more effectively had 
intelligence and compassion carried the day. 
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